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ABSTRACT
What sort of defense is provided by the ministerial exception to employment
discrimination claims? The ministerial exception bars civil courts from reviewing
the decisions of religious organizations regarding the employment of their ministe-
rial employees. While the exception itself is widely recognized by courts, there is
confusion with respect to the proper characterization of the defense provided by the
exception: should it be seen as a subject matter jurisdiction defense, or as a chal-
lenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim? This Article argues that
articulating the right answer to this question of civil procedure is crucial to a proper
understanding of the role that the ministerial exception plays as a constitutional
protection for the religious freedom of churches and other religious institutions. The
Article explores the ministerial exception to anti-discrimination law as a case study
of the extent to which the U.S. Constitution adequately protects the freedom of the
church. The ministerial exception is best understood as a subject matter jurisdiction
defense, and getting the right answer to this civil procedure question is not just a
matter of citing the right procedural rule in the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Instead, careful attention to this question leads to a better understanding of the
foundations of our constitutional order. When courts clearly and consistently treat
the ministerial exception as a limitation on their subject matter jurisdiction, they
make a powerful statement about the foundations of limited government-they
affirm the penultimacy of the state. Yet, even though the jurisdictional approach to
the ministerial exception does provide crucial protection for one dimension of
institutional religious freedom, this Article suggests that the jurisdictional approach
alone cannot provide an adequate constitutional foundation for robust protection of
the freedom of the church.
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INTRODUCTION
What sort of defense is provided by the ministerial exception to employment
discrimination claims? The ministerial exception "bars civil courts from reviewing
decisions of religious organizations relating to the employment of their ministers."1
Invoking this doctrine, courts routinely dismiss claims of race and sex discrimination
brought by ministers against their religious employers under Title VII and other fed-
eral and state anti-discrimination laws.2 The doctrine serves to protect religious
Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (W.D. Tenn. 2005),
aft'd, 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner,
recently suggested that the doctrine might better be characterized as the "internal affairs" doc-
trine, because "[t]he assumption behind the rule... is that Congress does not want courts to
interfere in the internal management of churches." Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472,
475 (7th Cir. 2008). The doctrine protects churches from courts telling them "whom to ordain
(or retain as an ordained minister), how to allocate authority over the affairs of the church, or
which rituals and observances are authentic.... That is why the ministers exception is better
termed the 'internal affairs' doctrine." Id. (quoting Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442
F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006)). While Judge Posner's suggestion accurately reflects the
fundamental purpose of the doctrine, this Article will follow the practice of most courts in
referring to the doctrine as the "ministerial exception."
2 See, e.g., Boggan v. Miss. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 222 F. App'x 352
(5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 63 (2007) (dismissing Title VII and § 1981 race dis-
crimination claims); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church,
173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a Title VII sex discrimination claim); Rayburn v.
Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1020 (1986) (dismissing Title VII race and sex discrimination claims); Cronin v.
S. Ind. Annual Conference, United Methodist Church, No. 1:05-cv- I 804-LUM-WTL, 2007
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organizations from secular control or manipulation in the choice of employees who
perform spiritual functions by "preclud[ing] any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons be-
hind a church's ministerial employment decision." 3 Rooted in the First Amendment's
protection for religious freedom, the exception recognizes that the Constitution pro-
tects "the unfettered right"4 of a church to make such employment decisions.
While the protection recognized by the exception has itself been widely ac-
cepted by the federal and state courts, the proper characterization of the defense
provided by the exception is a question on which courts disagree.5 Is the ministerial
exception a subject matter jurisdiction bar to consideration of the plaintiff's claim,
or is it a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs claim? I will argue in
this Article that articulating the right answer to this question of civil procedure is
crucial to a proper understanding of the role that the ministerial exception plays as
a constitutional protection for the religious freedom of churches and other religious
institutions. This technical question of civil procedure thus implicates a founda-
tional principle of constitutional order.6
Citizens with a commitment to religious freedom might reasonably assume that
institutional religious freedom-the freedom of the church to be the church-lies at
the heart of the religious freedom protected by the First Amendment. 7 Yet constitu-
tional protection for the freedom of religious institutions to carry out their institutional
religious missions seems to be under assault today.' This assault draws constitutional
WL 2258762 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 3,2007) (dismissing a claim under Title VII and the Americans
with Disabilities Act); O'Connor v. Church of St. Ignatius Loyola, 779 N.Y.S.2d 31 (App.Div.
2004), appeal denied, 820 N.E.2d 292 (N.Y. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1017 (2005)
(dismissing employment discrimination claims).
' EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000).
4 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
' See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198,206 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302-03 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007); see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petruska, 462 F.3d 294 (No. 06-985), 2007 WL 128608, at
*17 n.3 (noting an emerging split on whether ministerial exception claims present ajurisdic-
tional bar); cf. Schleicher, 518 F.3d at 478 (arguing that the exception should be understood
as a merits defense that should be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, see
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c), rather than a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
6 See discussion infra Part II.
7 Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of the Everson Decision andAmerica's Church
State Proposition, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 15, 41 (2007-08) ("The central value of the First
Amendment is, then, freedom in two senses-not only in the cause of conscience in spiritual
matters, but also.., the necessity of having the government step back so as to let the church
be the church.").
' See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Freedom to be a Church: Confronting
Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 387, 450 (2005);
Michael P. Moreland, Religious Free Exercise and Anti-Discrimination Law, 70 ALB. L. REv.
1417 (2007).
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support from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, where the Court held that neutral laws of general application do not run afoul
of the Free Exercise Clause even when those laws impose significant burdens on reli-
gious practice.9 The Court in Smith refused to recognize any constitutionally required
free exercise exemption from Oregon's drug laws for the religiously inspired use of
peyote, even though the ingestion of peyote for sacramental purposes is a central
component of worship in the Native American Church."°
Following Smith, courts have held that states are empowered to tell religious
entities that their religiously motivated activities in society must comply with prevail-
ing notions of morality that are embodied in the law, even when those laws come into
conflict with the religious entities' doctrinal commitments." Thus, for example, rely-
ing on Smith, courts have required religiously affiliated social service agencies to com-
ply with legislative mandates to include contraceptive coverage in their employees'
prescription drug benefits. 2 In light of Smith, these rulings come "as no great sur-
prise,"'13 but they have implications extending beyond mandatory contraceptive cover-
age statutes. As Professor Susan J. Stabile has noted, the legislation unsuccessfully
challenged by religious employers in these cases establishes a "dangerous precedent":
[It] fails to respect the integrity of religious institutions, [thus]
threatening the Church's autonomy and right of self-definition....
The legislation in question raises a fundamental question of who
decides what a religious institution is, and who defines the institu-
tion's mission. It also sets a dangerous precedent for even greater
intrusions on religion in the future."'
9 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990).
10 Id. at 874; see also id. at 903--04 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Peyote is a sacrament of
the Native American Church and is regarded as vital to respondents' ability to practice their
religion.... Under Oregon law, as construed by that State's highest court, members of the
Native American Church must choose between carrying out the ritual embodying their religious
beliefs and avoidance of criminal prosecution." (citation omitted)).
" See Catholic Charities of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006), cert. denied
sub nom. Catholic Charities of Albany v. Dinallo, 128 S. Ct. 97 (2007); Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004).
12 See Serio, 859 N.E.2d at 465 ("Smith is an insuperable obstacle to plaintiffs' federal free
exercise claim."); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 81-90
(Cal. 2004) (discussing the applicability of Smith), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004).
13 Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying
Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 741, 744 (2005).
"4 Id. at 745-46. The issues raised by these legislative mandate cases are not, of course,
unique to Catholicism. Baptist institutions, for example, joined with Catholic Charities and
other Catholic entities in challenging the New York contraception coverage mandate. See Serio,
859 N.E.2d at 462-63. Yet the extensive network of Catholic social service institutions makes
the question of institutional religious freedom particularly acute for the Catholic Church. The
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In contrast to these recent contraceptive mandate decisions, courts have uniformly
held that a religious institution's ministerial employees cannot invoke federal or state
statutes that forbid employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex in order
to challenge the employment decisions made by their religious employers.' 5 Yet such
anti-discrimination statutes are neutral laws of general application. 6 Smith, there-
fore, can be read to support the conclusion that ministers seeking to bring sex or race
discrimination claims against the religious institutions that employ them should not
be barred from doing so.17 If the Court in Smith was willing to allow a state to
stakes are high:
The Catholic Church understands itself to be at the service of the human
family, and the most tangible expression of that spirit is the network of
charitable and social service institutions run by the church[:] schools,
shelters, clinics, hospitals, counseling centers, and so on. That service,
however, takes place in a pluralistic, secular culture governed by laws
which do not always reflect the social and moral doctrine of Roman
Catholicism. One perennial issue for Catholic institutions, therefore, is
the extent to which they can adapt themselves to secular mores in order
to serve the largest population possible, without losing their Catholic
identity.... The open question is to what extent the secular culture will
be willing to bend to accommodate the deeply held moral beliefs of reli-
gious groups; and to what extent the Catholic Church, riding a strong
wave of identity concerns, will feel the need to disentangle its institutions
from partnerships with humanitarian groups or government agencies for
fear of complicity in values at odds with church teaching.
John L. Allen, Jr., Vatican Correspondent, National Catholic Reporter, Keynote Address,
Symposium on the Jurisprudential Legacy of John Paul II, in 45 J. CATHoLIc LEGAL STUD.
229, 239 (2006). This need to avoid complicity in values at odds with church teaching led
Catholic Charities in the Archdiocese of Boston to discontinue providing adoption services
under a contract with the state's Department of Social Services, because Massachusetts law
prohibits discrimination according to sexual orientation in the placement of adopted children.
The Archdiocese concluded that Catholic Charities could not cooperate with the placement
of children with same-sex couples without violating the church's teaching against legal
recognition of same-sex unions. Id. In the absence of a legislative exemption from the
general state law prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, Catholic
Charities chose to cease providing an important social service, which it had been providing
for over 100 years. Patricia Wen, "They Cared for the Children"; Amid Shifting Social
Winds, Catholic Charities Prepares to End its 103 Years of Finding Homes for Foster
Children and Evolving Families, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2006, at A1. Since its founding,
Catholic Charities had placed more children in homes than any other agency in the state, and
it was widely respected as the "top private provider of adoptive homes for hard-to-place
foster children." Id.; Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON
GLOBE, March 11, 2006, at Al (noting that "[t]he agency was especially adept at finding
homes for so-called 'special needs' adoptions, which include children who are older or who
have significant physical or emotional disabilities").
'5 See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2 (2000).
'7 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
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criminalize the sacramental ingestion of peyote in the context of worship within the
Native American Church, why should the government be prevented from requiring
religious employers to bring their ministerial selection criteria into line with the
requirements of neutral and generally applicable anti-discrimination law?' 8 Isn't
"[e]nding centuries of discrimination"' 9 on the basis of sex at least as important a goal
as stemming the dangers that flow from the use of peyote? Nonetheless, even in the
wake of Smith, "courts and commentators still find it unimaginable that the Catholic
Church or [the] Southern Baptist Convention might be required to comply with anti-
discrimination law. At some visceral level, it is considered an impossibility. ' 0
The ministerial exception is the legal doctrine invoked to protect religious
institutions from the requirements of anti-discrimination law in the ministerial
employment context. First recognized by the Fifth Circuit in McClure v. Salvation
Army,2 the exception has been widely adopted by the state and federal
courts-although the U.S. Supreme Court itself has neither recognized nor rejected
the ministerial exception.22 In order for the exception to apply, the employer must
be a religious institution and the employee must function as a minister.23 The
employer need not, however, be a church, diocese or synagogue, or an entity
operated by such a religious organization.' Instead, a religious employer is any
entity "'whose mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics."' 25
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1965, 1983 (2007) ("Under
Smith... the free exercise clause should not shield religious practices from Title VI."); id.
at 1984 (criticizing attempts made by courts and commentators to distinguish Smith in the min-
isterial exception context). In contrast, Kathleen Brady argues that Smith should be under-
stood to support a broad right to church autonomy extending to all aspects of church affairs.
See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons
of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633, 1636, 1649-56, 1672-79; see also Chopko & Moses,
supra note 8, at 404 ("Smith preserved church autonomy claims from its doctrinal revision.").
18 See Corbin, supra note 17, at 2003.
'9 Id.; see also Sarah Fulton, Note, Petruska v. Gannon University: A Crack in the Stained
Glass Ceiling, 14 WM. & MARY J. WoMEN & L. 197 (2007); Lauren P. Heller, Note, Modifying
the Ministerial Exception: Providing Ministers with a Remedyfor Employment Discrimination
Under Title VII While Maintaining First Amendment Protections of Religious Freedom, 81
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 663 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Tension Between Sex Equality and
Religious Freedom (Univ. of Chi. Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 167,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=995325; cf. Joshua D. Dunlap, Note, When
Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005 (2007).
20 Corbin, supra note 17, at 2003.
21 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
22 Corbin, supra note 17, at 1966.
23 Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223,225 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 134 (2007).
24 id.
2 Id. at 226 (quoting Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299,
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Thus, religiously affiliated schools and hospitals are religious employers for pur-
poses of the ministerial exception. 6 In addition, the category of ministerial em-
ployee is not limited to those who are ordained ministers.27 Instead, ministerial
status is determined by considering the employee's function within the religious
institution.28 The ministerial exception applies if "'the employee's primary duties
consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a reli-
gious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship."' 29 The
exception has been applied to bar claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,30 the Americans with Disabilities Act,3' the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act,32 as well as state common law claims.
33
While many courts have recognized and applied the ministerial exception, they
have adopted a range of positions regarding the constitutional foundation for the
doctrine.34 Prior to Smith, the exception was often thought to be rooted in the Free
Exercise Clause.35 Many courts continue to adopt a free exercise rationale, even
though the reasoning of Smith would seem to undermine that approach.36 Other courts
and commentators see the exception as rooted in a right to church autonomy that is
protected by the Establishment Clause, or in some combination of the First Amend-
ment's two religion clauses.37 Some level of constitutional protection for ministerial
310 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a predominantly Jewish nursing home is a religious employer
that can invoke the ministerial exception)).
26 Id. at 225.
27 Id. at 226.
28 Id.
29 Id. (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference Of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1169 (4th Cir. 1985)); see Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 1514, 1545
(1979) (articulating the functional understanding of ministerial employees).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16c (2000).
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
32 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
3 Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225 (citing cases).
14 See discussion infra Part IV; see also Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198,206 (2d Cir.
2008) ("Wherever its doctrinal roots may lie, the 'ministerial exception' is well entrenched;
it has been applied by circuit courts across the country for the past thirty-five years.").
31 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference Of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1168-69; see also Corbin, supra note 17, at 1977-79; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1396 (1981).
36 See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800-01, 800
n.* (4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church,
173 F.3d 343,347-50 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,461-63,
467 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Brady, supra note 17, at 1649-56.
17 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 17, at 1979-80; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-
BasedInitiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAULL. REV. 1, 34 n.162 (2005) (noting that the
ministerial exception is "born of both Establishment and Free Exercise considerations"); see
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employment decisions might also be rooted in the Court's precedents recognizing a
First Amendment right of expressive association.38
To what extent might a doctrine like the ministerial exception provide a consti-
tutional foundation for the freedom of the church to be the church? Some scholars,
including the Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray, have suggested that protec-
tion for the freedom of the church was "codified" in the First Amendment.39 Murray
argued that the religion clauses of the First Amendment "sufficiently achieved" the
important objective of guaranteeing the church "a full independence in the fulfill-
ment of her divine mission." ° Others, including Professor Richard Garnett, are "not
so sure."'" Garnett questions whether "there actually is, in American constitutional
law, a commitment to-or even room for"-a rich understanding of the freedom of
the church.42 While there are a variety of constitutional doctrines, including the
ministerial exception, that have the effect of protecting various dimensions of
institutional religious freedom, Garnett suggests that constitutional doctrines like the
ministerial exception "do not, in fact, evidence a robust, underlying commitment in
our law to the libertas ecclesiae principle.
43
Even the ministerial exception may be difficult to square with the Court's recent
religion clause jurisprudence. 44 While some form of the ministerial exception might
well be grounded in the Court's expressive association precedents,4 the right of ex-
pressive association can be overcome by a compelling governmental interest." Given
the anemic fashion in which courts often engage in compelling interest analysis when
faced with a claim of religious freedom,47 freedom of expressive association may not
also Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IOWAL. REV. 1, 44,49, 50 n.201 (1998-99); cf. Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518
F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that while "the ministers exception is a rule of
interpretation, not a constitutional rule," it is derived from policies that "come from the
establishment clause rather than from the free-exercise clause").
38 See Corbin, supra note 17, at 1981,2032-38; Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group
Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515,
517, 522, 528-30 (2007); Richard W. Garnett, John Courtney Murray on the "Freedom of
the Church", 4 J. CATHOLIC Soc. THOUGHT 59, 86 & n.145 (2007).
3' Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 38, at 60-61; see JOHN COURTNEY
MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN
PROPOSITION 69-71 (1960).
40 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 70.
"' Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 38, at 63.
42 Id.
13 Id. at 64; see also id. at 73 (questioning whether the constitutionally protected religious
liberty of believers expressing their beliefs in and through communities "is the same thing,
and up to the same 'revolutionary' task," as Murray "meant by the freedom of the Church").
4' See discussion infra Parts Ill & IV.
41 See supra note 38 (citing Corbin and Garnett).
4 Corbin, supra note 17, at 2032-38.
41 See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91 (Cal.
2004) (noting that a California contraceptive coverage mandate statute passes strict scrutiny
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end up providing robust protection to the freedom of the church, even when the church
invokes religious doctrine in support of its ministerial selection criteria. In the face of
this doctrinal indeterminacy, Gamett asks a provocative question: does the libertas
ecclesiae principle survive in the First Amendment, as Murray argued, and did it ever
do "any real work, in Religion Clause theory and doctrine?" Garnett's question
prompts another, equally provocative, question: To what extent is it even possible to
talk successfully about a theological principle like "the freedom of the church" in the
language of the law?49
This Article endeavors to explore these questions by examining the ministerial
exception to anti-discrimination law as a case study of the extent to which the U.S.
Constitution adequately protects the freedom of the church. The focus of this ex-
ploration will be the question of the nature of the defense provided by the ministerial
exception: should the ministerial exception be characterized as a subject matter
jurisdiction defense, or as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs
claim? And how is the answer to this procedural question related to the idea of the
freedom of the church?
Part I will briefly describe the confusion that currently exists regarding the nature
of the defense provided by the ministerial exception. Part II will discuss the theo-
logical principle of the freedom of the church, and argue that a proper understanding
of this principle includes ajurisdictional distinction between church and state. Part In1
will outline Professor Carl Esbeck's theory of the structural Establishment Clause
and suggest that his understanding of the Establishment Clause has important points of
contact with Murray's understanding of the jurisdictional implications of the freedom
of the church. Esbeck's structural understanding of the Establishment Clause demon-
strates that the principle of the freedom of the church is not an idea entirely foreign to
the U.S. Constitution. Part IV will then explain why the ministerial exception is best
understood as a subject matter jurisdiction defense. Getting the right answer to this
civil procedure question is not just a matter of citing the right procedural rule in the
defendant's motion to dismiss; rather careful attention to this question will lead to
a better understanding of the foundations of our constitutional order. When courts
clearly and consistently treat the ministerial exception as a limitation on the subject
matter jurisdiction of the civil courts, they make a powerful statement about the foun-
dations of limited government: Such statements affirm the penultimacy of the state.
Yet, even though it provides crucial protection for a dimension of institutional religious
freedom, the jurisdictional approach alone cannot provide an adequate constitutional
foundation for robust protection of the freedom of the church.
under the free exercise clause of the California Constitution).
48 Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 38, at 73.
9 See James Boyd White, Talking About Religion in the Language of the Law: Impossible
But Necessary, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 177 (1998).
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1. PETRUSKA'S MISTAKE
In Petruska v. Gannon University, the Third Circuit wrongly concluded that the
ministerial exception defense should be characterized as a challenge to the legal suf-
ficiency of the plaintiff's claim.5" Lynette Petruska, a former university chaplain at
Gannon University, filed an employment discrimination action in federal court against
Gannon, a private Catholic diocesan college." Her claim alleged that she had been
demoted as the result of a restructuring of the University Chaplain's office, and that
this action had been taken by the university on the basis of her gender.52
The university responded to her lawsuit by invoking the ministerial exception and
filing a motion to dismiss her claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the
alternative, for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.53 The district
court granted the university's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and Petruska
appealed. 4 While the Third Circuit agreed that the ministerial exception required the
district court to dismiss Petruska's sex discrimination action, the court did not believe
that the ministerial exception should be understood as ajurisdictional bar.55 Instead,
the court noted that the ministerial exception is properly raised in a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
The Petruska court maintained that the ministerial exception should not be con-
sidered a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, because, in its view, the exception does
not take away a federal court's very power to hear this sort of case.57 The court ex-
plained that "it is beyond cavil that a federal district court has the authority to review
claims arising under federal law,' 58 and Petruska had asserted a sex discrimination
50 462 F.3d 294, 295 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007).
" Id. at 302.
52 Id. at 300-0I.
53 Id. at 302.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
5 Id. at 303.
58 Id. at 302; see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir.
2004) ("Federal question jurisdiction is statutorily established, giving district courts 'original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.' 28 U.S.C. § 1331.") (holding that the ministerial exception should not be understood
as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction); cf. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196
F.3d 940,951 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Any non-frivolous assertion of a federal claim suffices to estab-
lish federal question jurisdiction, even if that claim is later dismissed on the merits .... "); Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) ("Jurisdiction... is not defeated... by the possibility that
the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.
... IT]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for
a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.").
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claim arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because the claim arose
under a federal statute, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Rather than seeing the exception as a constitutionally mandated limit on the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of civil courts, the Petruska court drew on precedent from the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits in support 9 of its conclusion that the ministerial exception
is best characterized as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim.'
While a federal court does have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this sort of claim
arising under a federal employment discrimination statute, the First Amendment bars
a court from granting relief to a ministerial employee asserting such a claim. 6' In this
respect, the court explained, the ministerial exception is like a government official's
defense of qualified immunity.62 The court noted that defendants often raise the issue
of qualified immunity in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim;
it is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.63 As in the case of qualified immunity,
the ministerial "exception may serve as a barrier to the success of a plaintiff's claims,
but it does not affect the court's authority to consider them."'
While the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits65 view the ministerial exception as a
challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim, other courts characterize it
as a subject matter jurisdiction bar. As the Sixth Circuit recently explained:
The ministerial exception, a doctrine rooted in the First Amend-
ment's guarantees of religious freedom, precludes subject matter
jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship
between a religious institution and its ministerial employees, based
on the institution's constitutional right to be free from judicial
interference in the selection of those employees.'
Thus, to raise the ministerial exception as a defense to an employment discrimina-
tion claim is to challenge the court's very power to hear and decide a ministerial
59 Id.
o Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302 (citing Elvig, 375 F.3d at 955; Bryce v. Episcopal Church
of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002)).
61 id.
62 Id. (citing Bryce, 289 F.3d at 654) ("If the church autonomy doctrine applies to the state-
ments and materials on which plaintiffs have based their claims, then the plaintiffs have no
claim for which relief may be granted. In this sense, the assertion that the First Amendment
precludes the sexual harassment suit is similar to a government official's defense of qualified
immunity .....
63 id.
64 Id. at 303.
63 The Tenth Circuit in Bryce was considering the related "church autonomy doctrine,"
rather than the ministerial exception itself. See id. at 302.
' Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 134 (2007).
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employee's claim against a religious institution. 67 A large number of courts share
this jurisdictional understanding of the ministerial exception.6" As the Seventh Circuit
67 See Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 42-43
(noting that a "jurisdictional dismissal is a concession that the issue in dispute.., is not within
the court's constitutional power" to decide, and "[j ]urisdiction, of course, concerns the scope
of a court's power as defined by the Constitution").
68 See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 190 (2006); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795
(4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173
F.3d 343,345 (5th Cir. 1999); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,
894 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting minister's assertion "that lay courts have juris-
diction to hear his age discrimination claims"); Gomez v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in
Am., No. 1:07CV786, 2008 WL 3202925, at *6, *10 (M.D.N.C. Aug 7,2008) (granting Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Cronin v. S. Ind. Annual
Conference, United Methodist Church, No.1:05-cv-1804-LJM-WTL, 2007 WL 2258762, at *6
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2007) (stating that because plaintiffs position falls under the ministerial
exception, "the Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction in this case"); Rweyemamu
v. Cote, No.3:05CV00969WWE, 2006 WL 306654, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 8,2006) (holding
that "pursuant to the constitutional mandate of the Free Exercise Clause, we lack subject matter
jurisdiction"), aff'd, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008); Patsakis v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese
of Am., 339 F. Supp. 2d 689, 692-93 (W.D. Pa. 2004) ('The propriety of asserting the
'ministerial exception' defense through a 12(b)(1) motion... is well-established."); Musante
v. Notre Dame of Easton Church, No. Civ.A.301CV2352MRK, 2004 WL 721774, at *5 (D.
Conn. Mar. 30, 2004) ("When the ministerial exception applies, courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over the case."); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1134 (Colo. 1996) (finding
that the ministerial exception precludes courts "from taking jurisdiction" over the claims);
Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 911 A.2d 319,324 (Conn. App.
2006) ("It bears emphasis that the ministerial exception is jurisdictional rather than eviden-
tiary. Religious institutions need not rely on proof of affirmative defenses in employment
discrimination suits but may categorically resist the judicial intrusion implicit in inquiry into
their employment practices and relationships."); Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch. of the
Archdiocese of Wash., Inc., 875 A.2d 669,674 (D.C. 2005) ("Our own decisions most analo-
gous to this case teach that the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds
is properly analyzed as a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under [Rule] 12(b)(1).");
Malichi v. Archdiocese of Miami, 945 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("[Clivil
courts lack subject-matterjurisdiction... to consider Appellant's claim because it constitutes
an internal employment dispute between a priest and his church."); Esbeck, Establishment
Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 49 & 50 n.201; Lupu & Tuttle, Faith-Based
Initiative and the Constitution, supra note 37, at 34 n. 162 (explaining that the limitations of
the ministerial exception "go to subject-matter jurisdiction of the civil courts"); see also
Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996,998-99 (D. Kan. 2004) (noting that
some courts have characterized the ministerial exception as jurisdictional, while others have
held that it is more appropriately characterized as a challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
claim under Rule 12(b)(6)); cf. Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.
2008) (explaining that while federal courts "do not have jurisdiction to decide ecclesiastical
controversies," in the context of an action brought to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the "internal affairs" doctrine provides a merits defense that should be raised in a Rule 12(c)
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noted in another recent ministerial exception case, secular courts have no power to
speak-i.e., no jurisdiction-with respect to the issues surrounding a religious body's
choice of ministerial employees. 9
II. JURISDICTION AND THE FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH
John Courtney Murray was confident that the important objective of safeguarding
the freedom of the church was "sufficiently achieved by the religious provisions of the
First Amendment., 70 Murray argued that a jurisdictional "distinction between church
and state"71 was affirmed by the Constitution, and this distinction was adequate to
protect the freedom of the church:
This affirmation is made through the imposition of limits on
government, which is confined to its own proper ends, those of
temporal society.... [T]he American Constitution does not pre-
sume to define the Church or in any way to supervise her exercise
of authority in pursuit of her own distinct ends. The Church is
entirely free to define herself and to exercise to the full her spiritual
jurisdiction. It is legally recognized that there is an area which lies
outside the competence of government. This area coincides with
the area of the divine mission of the Church, and within this area
the Church is fully independent, immune from interference by
political authority. 72
Murray concluded that "[iln the United States the freedom of the church was com-
pletely unfettered; she could organize herself with the full independence which is
her native right.,
73
What is the extent of the area of "spiritual jurisdiction" that lies beyond the
interference of political authority? The Second Vatican Council's Declaration on
Religious Freedom, a document on which Murray's thought exercised significant
influence,74 characterized the theological principle of the freedom of the church in this
way: the "freedom of the church is the fundamental principle in what concerns the
motion for judgment on the pleadings).
69 Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1037.
70 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 70.
71 Id.; see also id. at 65 (noting that the "distinction [between] the spiritual and temporal
orders and their respective jurisdictions" was a "key principle" for Roger Williams).
72 Id. at 70.
73 Id. at 71.
74 See Leslie Griffin, Commentary on Dignitatis humanae (Declaration on Religious
Freedom), in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS
249, 250-54, 257 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2005).
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relations between the church and governments and the whole civil order. 7' The
church claims for herself that "full measure of freedom which her care for the
salvation of men requires," and she bases that claim "in her character as a spiritual
authority, established by Christ the Lord," and given by divine mandate "the duty
of going out into the whole world and preaching the gospel to every creature. "76
The Declaration on Religious Freedom also articulates an alternative rationale
for the principle of the freedom of the church that is not rooted in the unique
mandate given by Christ to his Church: the church "also claims freedom for herself
in her character as a society of men who have the right to live in society in accor-
dance with the precepts of the Christian faith."77 "Religious bodies are a require-
ment of the social nature both of man and of religion itself. '78 Thus, the freedom
from coercion in religious matters that flows from the dignity of the human person
gives rise to a freedom from coercion when individuals act in community. 79 Under-
stood in this way, the freedom claimed by the Catholic Church is a freedom shared
by all churches and religious communities, and the content or object of the right
protected by the principle of the freedom of the church is the same for the Catholic
Church and all other religious bodies.80
The content of the institutional freedom demanded by the principle of the freedom
of the church is spelled out in Article 4 of the Declaration on Religious Freedom.8'
As the first words of the relevant text make clear, the principle of the freedom of the
church does not demand an absolute freedom from any legal regulation:
Provided the just requirements of public order are observed,
religious bodies rightfully claim freedom in order that they may
govern themselves according to their own norms, honor the
7 Declaration on Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 675, 693
(Walter M. Abbott ed., 1966) (Declaration No. 13).
76 Id. at 693-94.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 682 (Declaration No. 4).
'9 See discussion infra Part IV.E. 1.
80 See Declaration on Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note
75, at 682 n.9 (commentary by John Courtney Murray) [hereinafter Murray, Commentary and
Notes on the Declaration ofReligious Freedom]. The foundation of the freedom claimed by the
Catholic Church is the unique mandate of Christ. "In the case of other religious Communities,
the foundation of the right is the dignity of the human person, which requires that men be kept
free from coercion, when they act in community, gathered into Churches, as well as when they
act alone." Id.; see also Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 75, at 694 (Declaration
No. 13) (stating that because all people "possess the civil right not to be hindered in leading
their lives in accordance with their conscience.., a harmony exists between the freedom of
the Church and the religious freedom which is to be recognized as the right of all men and
communities and sanctioned by constitutional law").
8' See Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 75.
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Supreme Being in public worship, assist their members in the
practice of the religious life, strengthen them by instruction, and
promote institutions in which they may join together for the pur-
pose of ordering their own lives in accordance with their religious
principles.82
The freedom of the church also gives rise to freedom from coercion in the areas
of church life most directly relevant to the ministerial exception:
Religious bodies also have the right not to be hindered, either
by legal measures or by administrative action on the part of
government, in the selection, training, appointment, and transfer-
ral of their own ministers, in communicating with religious au-
thorities and communities abroad, in erecting buildings for reli-
gious purposes, and in the acquisition and use of suitable funds or
properties."
The freedom of the church also protects the freedom of the church to speak in the
public square, both in order to spread the faith and in order to influence public policy:
Religious bodies also have the right not to be hindered in their
public teaching and witness to their faith, whether by the spoken
or by the written word.... In addition, it comes within the mean-
ing of religious freedom that religious bodies should not be pro-
hibited from freely undertaking to show the special value of their
doctrine in what concerns the organization of society and the
inspiration of the whole of human activity.'
As Murray notes, by affirming the right to bring the insights of faith to bear on
the whole of human activity-including questions of public policy-the principle
of the freedom of the church stands against any attempts to argue that religion is a
purely private affair that must be kept confined to the sacristy.85 Instead, the
82 Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 75, at 682 (emphasis added)
(Declaration No. 4).
83 Id. (emphasis added).
' Id. at 682-83. The Declaration also explains that "the social nature of man and the very
nature of religion afford the foundation of the right of men freely to hold meetings and to
establish educational, cultural, charitable, and social organizations, under the impulse of their
own religious sense." Id. at 683.
85 See Murray, Commentary and Notes on the Declaration of Religious Freedom, supra
note 80.
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Declaration insists that "[r]eligion is relevant to the life and action of society.
Therefore religious freedom includes the right to point out this social relevance of
religious belief."86 This aspect of the freedom of the church is indeed "a core
religious function"; it is an "integral part of the practice of religion to speak to the
moral and spiritual dimensions of social issues. 87 The effective exercise of this
aspect of the freedom of the church empowers the church to be the church by
serving as a voice speaking out to protect the dignity and transcendence of the
human person in the face of state efforts to assert omnipotent omnicompetence over
all areas of human life and human activity.88
The Declaration confidently asserts that where these components of the principle
of the freedom of the church are taken seriously in law and in practical application,
"there the Church succeeds in achieving a stable situation of right as well as of fact
and the independence which is necessary for the fulfillment of her divine mission.
This independence is precisely what the authorities of the Church claim in society."89
Taken as a whole, the Declaration on Religious Freedom teaches that the freedom
of the church-the independence necessary for the fulfillment of the church's divine
mission-is not an absolute freedom.90 Instead, it is an assertion of internal institutional
autonomy and freedom from arbitrary regulation. 9' As Article 4 of the Declaration
makes clear, the just demands of public order (the promotion of justice, peace, and
public morality) may give rise to reasonable regulation of the activity of the church
in the temporal sphere without violating the principle of the freedom of the church.92
86 Id. at683 n.ll.
87 Robert T. Kennedy, Contributions of Dignitatis Humanae to Church-State Relations
in the United States, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PAUL VI AND DIGNITATIS HUMANAE 103 (John
T. Ford ed., 1995); see also Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World, in
THE DOCUMENTS OF THE VATICAN II, supra note 75, at 199, 288-89 ("[I]t is always and
everywhere legitimate for [the Church] to preach the faith with true freedom, to teach her
social doctrine, and to discharge her duty among men without hindrance.").
88 See MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 68 (noting that the American
understanding of separation of church and state rejects "the juridical omnipotence and omni-
competence of the state").
89 Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 75, at 694 (Declaration No. 13).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
9' Kennedy, supra note 87, at 96, 97 (arguing that church and state "[e]ach must enjoy
internal autonomy; each must respect the freedom of the other to fulfill its function in service
to the larger society of which each is a part; neither may assume the role nor responsibilities of
the other").
92 Id. at 96 ("[The] independence 'necessary for the fulfillment of the Church's divine
mission,' [is] not an absolute independence denying all regulatory authority in civil govern-
ment."). The components of public order-justice, peace, and public morality-are outlined in
no. 7 of the Declaration. See Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 75, at 685-87
(Declaration No. 7); see also Gregory A. Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation:
Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL.
INTERDIsc. L.J. 1, 14-30 (2006) (discussing the role played by the concept of public order in the
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That assertion, of course, begs a critical question: who is to determine when
regulation of the activity of the church is a reasonable response to the just demands
of public order, and how is that determination to be made? In other words, "when,
and to what extent, may civil government place restrictions upon the exercise of
religious freedom?"93 Current U.S. constitutional doctrine provides a distressingly
expansive answer to this question. The Court in Employment Division v. Smith held
that the Free Exercise Clause provides no protection for religious freedom when a
neutral law of general application incidentally imposes a burden on religiously moti-
vated activity-no matter how significant that burden might be, and no matter how
insignificant a threat to the government's interest in promoting public order might
be posed by judicial recognition of an exception to the regulation. 94
The Declaration on Religious Freedom did provide some specificity regarding
the elements of the public order component of the common good: the state acts prop-
erly through law when its objective is to promote justice, public peace, and public
morality.95 The Declaration did not, however, specify what sort of legal framework
ought to be employed in order to determine when the demands of public order justify
placing a particular restriction on the exercise of religious freedom, nor did it take
a position on what institution-the judiciary or the legislature-should have the
primary role in determining whether a particular restriction is reasonable in light of
the demands of public order. 96 As John Courtney Murray himself recognized, "the
criterion of public order remains general, in need of further specification, and subject
to abuse.''97 The Smith rule seems to enhance dramatically the possibility that the
public order criterion will be abused by legislatures insensitive to the demands of
religious freedom or opposed to the sort of challenge that the robust recognition of
the freedom of the church presents to the ideology of state monism.
Acknowledging the potential for abuse of the public order criterion, Murray argued
that the state, through law, could restrict "religious expression (in public rites, teach-
ing, observance, or behavior), only when such forms of public expression seriously
violate either the public peace or commonly accepted standards of public morality,
or the rights of other citizens. 98 Murray recognized that a practical problem arises
Declaration).
" Kennedy, supra note 87, at 107. John Courtney Murray saw this question as the "'crucial
issue' in the care of religion by government." Id. (citing John Courtney Murray, The Problem
of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 519, 527, 528 (1964)).
9 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Garnett, Freedom of the Church,
supra note 38, at 77-78.
9' See Francis P. Canavan, Dignitatis Humanae, The Catholic Concept of the State and
Public Morality, in CATHOLICISM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 81 (Kenneth L. Grasso & Robert
P. Hunt eds., 2006).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 82-93.
97 Kennedy, supra note 87, at 108 (emphasis added).
98 Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, supra note 94, at 530 (emphasis added).
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in trying to apply this general principle to particular cases-how to avoid arbitrary
application of the public order principle by the public power? Murray responded to
this problem by outlining four fundamental requirements that should be adhered to
in the casuistry that necessarily develops as the principle is applied in practice:
[That the violation of the public order be really serious; that legal
or police intervention be really necessary; that regard be had for
the privileged character of religious freedom, which is not simply
to be equated with other civil rights; that the rule of jurisprudence
of the free society be strictly observed, scil., as much freedom as
possible, as much coercion as necessary.99
The Smith rule takes none of these requirements into account. 100 In contrast,
Robert T. Kennedy argues that "Murray's four requirements come close to express-
ing the essence of a legal doctrine used for many years by American courts [prior to
Smith] to assess the constitutionality of legislation" that substantially burdened the
free exercise of religion.1' Under the compelling interest test articulated by the Court
in Sherbert v. Verner,'0 2 the government was prohibited from burdening religious
exercise "unless the government is able to demonstrate that the restriction is necessary
to further a paramount or compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive
means of doing so."103 Kennedy contends that this pre-Smith constitutional rule of
strict scrutiny of laws that burden religious freedom was "entirely consistent" with the
teaching of the Declaration, presumably including its teaching on the freedom of the
church. 1°4 Prior to Smith, then, it might not have been so hard to identify within the
99 Id. at 530. Murray further explained that the issues of casuistry
will call for a continual dialogue between the public powers and the
personal and political consciousness of the citizenry, with a view to
finding equitable solutions.... What chiefly matters is that the free exer-
cise of religion should always be responsible.... What further matters
is the spirit of tolerance, as a moral attitude, among the citizenry-a spirit
of reverence and respect for others, which issues in an abhorrence of
coercion in religious matters.
Id. If this moral attitude of tolerance is weak among the citizenry, and especially if this atti-
tude is weak among their legislative representatives, the Smith rule seriously erodes robust
constitutional protection for religious freedom.
100 See supra text accompanying note 9.
101 Kennedy, supra note 87, at 108.
102 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
103 Kennedy, supra note 87, at 108.
'o Id. at 110. Thus, Kennedy concludes that the teaching of the Declaration on Religious
Freedom "calls to the American legal system to return to one of the more resplendent of its
constitutional features." Id. But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990)
(noting that, outside the Sherbert context of the denial of unemployment compensation, the
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Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment adequate constitutional protection for
the freedom of the church. After Smith, greater attention must be paid to other
constitutional foundations for that freedom. 0 5 It may be time to take more seriously
the dimension of the principle of the freedom of the church that finds expression in
the jurisdictional distinction between church and state.
The principle of the freedom of the church finds its origins in a jurisdictional
conflict. The eleventh century papal call for "the freedom of the church" was a call
for "the liberation of the clergy from imperial, royal, and feudal domination and their
unification under papal authority."' 6 Thus, the cry for the "freedom of the church"
was a cry for "its freedom from control by 'the laity. '-107 The plurality of jurisdic-
tions and legal systems coexisting and competing within one community that Harold
Berman argues is "[p]erhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal
tradition" was itself the product of the church's medieval insistence on its institu-
tional freedom from lay, imperial domination: "The church declared its freedom
from secular control, its exclusive jurisdiction in some matters, and its concurrent
jurisdiction in other matters .... The very complexity of a common legal order
containing diverse legal systems contributed to legal sophistication."'
1 08
Murray characterized the dual jurisdiction flowing from the "ancient distinction
between church and state"--"[t]he dualism of mankind's two hierarchically ordered
forms of social life"-as "Christianity's cardinal contribution to the Western political
tradition."1°9 And Murray understood the limitations on governmental power articu-
lated in the First Amendment as the constitutional vehicle that brought this strand of
the Western political tradition into the American constitutional order.1 ° As Murray
explained:
Court has "always found the [Sherbert] test satisfied").
105 See supra notes 11-12.
106 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 103-04 (1983). The "principal aim of the [Papal] [Rievolution" was
"expressed in the slogan, 'the freedom of the church."' Id. at 105. Berman notes that the
freedom of the church
was not something that could be achieved overnight-indeed, in its
deepest significance it was not something that could be achieved ever-
yet the very depth of the idea, its combination of great simplicity and
great complexity, was a guarantee that the struggle to achieve it would
be, on the one hand, a prolonged one, over decades and generations and
even centuries, and on the other hand, a cataclysmic one, with drastic and
often violent changes occurring in rapid succession.
Id.
'07 Id. at 108. Berman argues that it was out of this controversy that "the first modern
Western theories of the state and secular law.., were born." Id. at 111.
108 Id. at 10.
09 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 64.
110 Id.
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The juridical result of the American limitation of governmental
powers is the guarantee to the Church of a stable condition of
freedom.... It should be added that this guarantee is made not
only to the individual . . . but to the Church as an organized
society with its own law and jurisdiction... Within society, as
distinct from the state, there is room for the independent exercise
of authority which is not that of the state."'
An incident from the early history of the American republic recounted by Leo
Pfeffer in his book, Church, State, and Freedom, indicates that the founders them-
selves understood the jurisdictional separation that is part of the "ancient distinction
between church and state" and recognized the limits of civil authority with respect
to the pre-existing, organized society that is the church:
In 1783 the papal nuncio at Paris addressed a note to Benjamin
Franklin suggesting that, since it was no longer possible to main-
tain the previous status whereunder American Catholics were
subject to the Vicar Apostolic in London, the Holy See proposed
to Congress that a Catholic bishopric be established in one of the
American cities. Franklin transmitted the note to the [Continental]
Congress, which directed Franklin to notify the nuncio that "the
subject of his application to Doctor Franklin being purely spiritual,
it is without the jurisdiction and powers of Congress, who have
no authority to permit or refuse it, these powers being reserved to
the several states individually." (Not many years later the several
states would likewise declare themselves to "have no authority
to permit or refuse" such a purely spiritual exercise of ecclesias-
tical jurisdiction.)".2
" Id. at 70-71 (emphasis added), quoted in Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural
Restraint, supra note 37, at 55 n.228. Murray notes that the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this
principle of church freedom in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). The
Kedroff case is discussed infra notes 213-17. See also Gregory A. Kalscheur, John Paul II,
John Courtney Murray, and the Relationship Between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Con-
structive Proposal for Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. CATHOLiC SOC. THOUGHT
231,245-48,265-66 (2004) (discussing the distinction between state and society as a central
feature of Catholic social thought).
II2 LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 108 (1967), quoted in MURRAY, WE
HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 71; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU
L. REV. 1385 (describing the disestablishment process in the states).
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Commenting on this incident, Murray noted that it had been "centuries [since] the
Holy See [had] been free to erect a bishopric and appoint a bishop without the prior
consent of government [and] all the legal formalities with which Catholic states had
fettered the freedom of the Church.""..3 This led Murray to conclude that "[i]n the
United States the freedom of the Church was completely unfettered; she could organize
herself with the full independence which is her native right."' 4 For Murray, jurisdic-
tional independence was evidence of the "stability of the Church's condition at law"
that is "the root of the matter" of the freedom of the church."5 The ancient recognition
of a sphere of jurisdiction reserved to the church that is beyond the authority of civil
government finds its American constitutional analog in what Professor Carl Esbeck
describes as the jurisdictional nature of the structural Establishment Clause.' " 6 The
structural Establishment Clause protects a reserved sphere in which the freedom of the
church is secure; a sphere "in which religious entities may operate unhindered by gov-
ernment in accordance with their own understanding of divine origin and mission."" 7
III. JURISDICTION AND THE STRUCTURAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Rather than trying to demonstrate why Smith does not eliminate a free exercise
foundation for the ministerial exception," 8 commentators like Carl Esbeck, Ira Lupu,
and Robert Tuttle argue that the ministerial exception is best understood as a juris-
dictional bar rooted in the Establishment Clause." 9 Esbeck, for example, maintains that
the line of Supreme Court precedent that gives rise to the ministerial exception "is more
easily understood when the Establishment Clause is conceptualized as a structural
restraint on the government's power to act on certain matters pertaining to religion."'2
As a structural principle, the Establishment Clause operates by policing ajurisdictional
boundary. Indeed, the structural Establishment Clause is a "model of dual jurisdic-
tions" '2 -the clause separates "two spheres of competence,"' 22 government and
religion, and orders the relationship that exists between those two spheres. Some
"' MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 71.
114 Id.
115 Id.
l 6 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 2.
11 Id. at 55-56; see also supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Catholic
Church's understanding of its divine origin and mission and the general issue of the freedom
of religious institutions).
18 See Brady, supra note 17.
"9 See Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 3-4;
Lupu & Tuttle, Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, supra note 37.
120 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 3-4.
121 Id. at 28.
122 Id. at 10.
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matters fall within the competence of civil government; others remain in the exclusive
sphere of religion; and others might be shared by religion and government. "
Understood in this way, the structural Establishment Clause serves as a powerful
witness to a fundamental commitment of American constitutionalism: the government
as an entity of limited authority. 124 Esbeck draws on the work of William Clancy and
Max L. Stackhouse to illustrate this point."5 Clancy, for example, explains that the
logical distinction between government and religion as two separate orders of com-
petence shows that
Caesar recognizes that he is only Caesar and forswears any attempt
to demand what is God's. (Surely this is one of history's more en-
couraging examples of secular modesty.) The State realistically
admits that there are severe limits on its authority and leaves the
churches free to perform their work in society.
126
Max Stackhouse sees the distinction between government and religion that is
recognized in the Establishment Clause as governmental recognition of religion as
a sort of co-equal, competing sovereign, outside the state's control with respect to
religious matters:
[The First] [A]mendment to the Constitution acknowledges the
existence of an arena of discourse, activity, commitment, and
organization for the ordering of life over which the state has no
authority. It is a remarkable thing in human history when the
authority governing coercive power limits itself .... However
much government may become involved in regulating various
aspects of economic, technological, medical, cultural, educational,
and even sexual behaviors in society, religion is an arena that,
when it is doing its own thing, is off limits. This is not only an
affirmation of the freedom of individual belief or practice, nor
only an acknowledgement that the state is noncompetent when
123 Id. at 14, 31. It should be noted that Esbeck's structural Establishment Clause thesis is
not a claim about the original meaning of the Clause. Instead, Esbeck argues that the Supreme
Court has treated the Establishment Clause as a structural restraint on government power in
a way that parallels "the dual-authority relationship of state and church that is deeply en-
trenched in the Western legal tradition." Esbeck, 60th Anniversary of the Everson Decision,
supra note 7, at 27.
12 See infra text accompanying note 129; infra Part IV.E.1.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 126-29.
,2 William Clancy, Religion as a Source of Tension, in RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCIETY
23, 27-28 (1958), quoted in Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra
note 37, at 10 n.34.
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it comes to theology, it is the recognition of a sacred domain that
no secular authority can fully control. Practically, this means
that at least one association may be brought into being in society
that has a sovereignty beyond the control of government. 27
How to define the sovereign arena in which religion "is doing its own thing" may
present us with significant challenges, but the fundamental point is clear. 28 The
structural Establishment Clause affirms limited government by recognizing that
some matters lie within an exclusive sphere of religion that is off limits to govern-
mental regulation. 129
Like John Courtney Murray, 3' Esbeck notes that this sort of jurisdictional division
of authority has deep roots in the Western jurisprudential tradition. Esbeck, for ex-
ample, quotes Roscoe Pound's description of the jurisdictional division that prevailed
in the Middle Ages: "In the politics and law of the Middle Ages the distinction be-
tween the spiritual and the temporal, between the jurisdiction of religiously organized
Christendom and the jurisdiction of the temporal sovereign, that is, of a politically orga-
nized society, was fundamental."' 3' This sort of division of authority and jurisdiction
reflects the conviction that the temporal power is "not the sole possessor of sover-
eignty." 132 The freedom of the church within the religious realm is aptly described as
a "sovereign authority." Government and religion might be seen as "cosovereigns"
in this sense: there is a territory beyond civil affairs that is "reserved to the churches.' 33
To characterize government and religion as cosovereigns is to recognize that the
churches are not simply voluntary organizations that exist at the sufferance of the
state. They are not simply "jural entities, and not mere creatures of the law deriving
their existence from the state. Rather, churches preexisted the state, are transnational,
and would continue to exist if the state were suddenly dissolved or destroyed."' 34
127 Max L. Stackhouse, Religion, Rights, and the Constitution, in AN UNSETTLED ARENA:
RELIGION AND THE BILLOF RIGHTS 92, 111 (Ronald C. White, Jr. & Albright G. Zimmerman
eds., 1990), quoted in Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37,
at 10 n.34 (emphasis added).
128 id.
129 id.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 72-118.
"' Roscoe Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1933), quoted
in Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 50 n.206; see also
MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 64 (noting that the "ancient distinction
between church and state..-"[t]he dualism of mankind's two hierarchically ordered forms of
social life"-"had been Christianity's cardinal contribution to the Western political tradition").
132 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 54 n.225
(quoting Mark DeWolfe Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REv.
91, 92-95 (1953)).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 55.
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Acknowledging the churches as social actors possessing independent authority
that is not that of the state places a powerful limit on the power of the state. Such
an acknowledgment affirms that the state's assertion of sovereignty is not absolute.
The protection of the freedom of churches as "sovereigns" not created by the state
points to the existence of another sovereignty (the only true sovereignty)-that of
a God (or gods)--existing "beyond, before, and superior to the state."'13' Esbeck
explains that "theistic religion posits a Sovereignty that sits in judgment over the
state, its ambitions to temporal power, and its pretensions of infallibility. It is for
this reason that at crucial points in Western history the institutional church had a
'pivotal role in guarding against political absolutism."" 36
As institutions that give public witness, each in their own way, to absolute truths
that transcend politics, the churches relativize politics. Religion has political impli-
cations simply by asserting that political truth does not encompass the totality of all
that humans can desire and know. By "[r]elativizing the political," religion "oper-
ates to expand that social space that is nongovernmental."'3 Those matters that fall
under the exclusive sovereignty of religion are beyond the jurisdiction of govern-
ment. 3 ' The resulting social space "give[s] breathing room to individuals, families,
' Id. at 67; cf Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on
the Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 181, 217 (2006) ("[Alfter all,
[God] is sovereign if anyone be."). Drawing on the work of Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., Brennan
notes that the American commitment to constitutional protection for religious freedom can
be understood as a recognition of God's sovereignty:
[I]t allows us human subjects to meet our indefeasible duty to inform
conscience and freely follow the will of the sovereign God.... We must
resist the Court's and others' claims on behalf of false sovereigns,....
not because we ourselves are individual sovereigns, but because, with
respect to seeking and instantiating the good, personal and common both,
we operate under an obligation that is nothing short of sovereign. The
natural law that gives birth to this right of ours to self-government is it-
self our intelligent participation as human subjects in the Eternal Law, the
mind of the sovereign God sweetly disposing all things to their proper
ends.
Id. at 224 (citation omitted).
36 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 67 (quoting
Gerard v. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and
State, 49 LA. L. REv. 1057, 1072 (1989)); see also MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra
note 39, at 204-05 ("[Tlhe freedom of the Church as the spiritual authority served as the
limiting principle of the power of government."); Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, supra
note 38, at 82 ("[T]here are reasons to think that the libertas ecclesiae principle has mattered
and does matter for the development and sustaining of constitutionally limited government.").
13' Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 68.
138 Id. at 109.
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neighborhoods, schools, and other mediating groups."'39 All this, Esbeck maintains,
follows from a structural, jurisdictional understanding of the Establishment Clause. 140
How does the structural Establishment Clause define the boundary between the
sphere of government and that of religion? This, Esbeck notes, "resolves itself down
to a question of jurisdiction,"' 41 and he judges the conclusion of Max Stackhouse to
be apt: when religion "is doing its own thing," it is off limits. 142 The government
exceeds its jurisdiction as limited by the Establishment Clause when it attempts to
regulate matters "in the exclusive sphere of religion"14 3 or matters that are "inherently
religious."'" Esbeck points to several Supreme Court cases to illustrate what he means
by these terms. 145 In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, for ex-
ample, the Court held that application of the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to the ordinary commercial activities of a religious organization did not violate
the religion clauses of the First Amendment.'" Because the Act's requirements "apply
only to commercial activities undertaken with a 'business purpose,"' they have "no
impact on [the religious organization's] own evangelical activities or on individuals
engaged in volunteer work for other religious organizations."'147 The record-keeping
requirements of the Act, like "such secular governmental activity as fire inspections
and building and zoning regulations," did not unconstitutionally intrude into religious
affairs.1 48 Insofar as it seeks to regulate the wages of employees involved in the ordi-
nary commercial activities of a religious entity, the FLSA is legislation operating
within the civil government's proper sphere of action; it does not invade the protected
religious sphere.' 49
' Id. at 68.
140 Id. at 75.
"' Carl H. Esbeck, Differentiating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 42 J.
CHURCH & ST. 311,325 (2000).
142 Id.
14' Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 78.
144 Id. at 77.
141 Id. at 78-81.
146 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985).
14" Id. at 305.
148 Id.
14' Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 79; cf.
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 503-04 (1979) (finding that because of the
unique mission-sensitive role played by teachers in a church-operated school, "serious First
Amendment questions" would follow from the NLRB' s exercise ofjurisdiction over teachers
in such schools). The Court in Catholic Bishop avoided deciding the constitutional question
by assuming, in the absence of clear intent to the contrary, the Congress intended to exempt
church-operated schools from regulation under the NLRA. Id. at 504-07. Esbeck argues that
under the structural Establishment Clause, the outcome would be the same, "but with eccle-
siastical autonomy protected without any timidity in stating that such a result is required by
the Establishment Clause." Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra
note 37, at 79.
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In contrast, when the government sponsors prayer in schools and religious dis-
plays in government buildings, it has improperly entered the realm of the exclusively
religious.' Thus, Esbeck suggests that cases like Lee v. Weisman,'51 where the Court
held that inviting clergy to offer prayers at graduation ceremonies for public middle
schools and high schools violated the Establishment Clause, and County of Allegheny
v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,' where the Court held that a cr~che displayed
on the grand staircase of the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause,
can be understood as "structural determinations by the Court that government
exceeded its power by involving itself in a matter beyond its authority."' 53
Deciding where to draw the line between the sphere of governmental competence
and the sphere of religious competence where government is not sovereign has been
a contentious task for 2,000 years.'54 It would, Esbeck argues, "be naive to suppose
that there is an easy formula for determining 'what is Caesar's and what is God's.""5
At the same time, however, Esbeck warns against exaggerating the difficulty involved
in drawing the line.'56 Paying attention to what the Supreme Court has decided in
its Establishment Clause cases "indicate[s] that government does not exceed the re-
straints of the Establishment Clause unless it is acting on topics that are 'inherently
religious. '"15 7 Examples of such topics include prayer, devotional Bible reading, ven-
eration of the Ten Commandments, classes in confessional religion, and the biblical
narrative of creation taught as science. 5' These topics are "off limits" as objects of
purposeful governmental action. 159 In contrast, subject matters that are not "inherently
religious" are legitimate objects for governmental action, even when the governmental
action reflects a moral judgment about the social good that might coincide with the
theological judgment of some religions."
Governmental action that would "involve government in the 'essentially religious
activities' of religious institutions" would cross the line into the sphere of the inher-
ently religious.' 6' In contrast, "where the contested governmental activity is calcu-
lated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the competence of the State,
and where the activity does not involve the State so significantly and directly in the
'"o See infra text accompanying notes 159-62.
151 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
152 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
1 Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 98 n.421.
114 See MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 64 ('The distinction
[between the spiritual and temporal orders] had always been difficult to maintain in practice,
even when it was affirmed in theory.").
"I Esbeck, Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint, supra note 37, at 104-05.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 105.
158 Id. at 105-06.
159 Id. at 106.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 108 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 658 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
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realm of the sectarian," then the government has not crossed the boundary into the
exclusive realm of religion. 62 Esbeck contends that "inherently religious" activities
are "those exclusively religious activities of worship and the propagation or incul-
cation of the sort of tenets that comprise confessional statements or creeds common
to many religions."' 163 The term "inherently religious" also embraces the supernatural
claims of religious communities "around which religion (religare) identifies and
defines itself, conducts its collective worship, divines and teaches doctrine, and
propagates the faith to children and adult converts."' ' These matters fall under the
exclusive sovereignty of religion; they are beyond the jurisdiction of government.165
The selection of ministers would seem to fall squarely within the sphere of ex-
clusive religious sovereignty, and the ministerial exception seems, therefore, to rest
upon a firm constitutional foundation under Esbeck's structural/jurisdictional theory
of the Establishment Clause. The selection of ministers is an activity that implicates
the supernatural claims of religious communities, including the claims around which
a religion identifies and defines itself, conducts its worship, develops and teaches doc-
trine, and propagates the faith. In this sense, the selection of ministers is an inherently
religious activity that falls within the exclusive competence of religion.
IV. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION, SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION, AND THE
FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH
The prevailing understanding of what the ministerial exception means and how
it operates leads to the conclusion that the exception should be characterized as a
subject-matter jurisdiction defense, not as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the
plaintiff's claim. Unlike the Third Circuit in Petruska, most courts do understand
the ministerial exception as a constitutionally mandated limitation on a court's power
to hear a particular category of cases brought against religious employers.' 66 Subject-
matter jurisdiction concerns "the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudi-
cate [a] case,, 167 and the label "jurisdictional" properly applies to "prescriptions delin-
eating the classes of cases.., falling within a court's adjudicatory power.' ' 68 As a
162 Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
163 Id. at 109.
164 Id.
165 Id.
'6 See cases cited supra note 68.
167 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); id. at 94 ("'Without
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law,
and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
and dismissing the cause."' (quoting Ex parte McCardle,74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869))).
168 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004); see also Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on
Human Rights & Opportunities, 911 A.2d 319, 322, cert. denied, 916 A.2d 51 (Conn. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 206 (2007) ("'Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the
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constitutional limitation that removes a class of cases from the court's adjudicatory
power, the ministerial exception is best understood as giving rise to a subject-matter
jurisdiction objection.'69 In other words, the First Amendment denies courts the
authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy-claims that seek to
impose secular standards on a religious institution's employment of its ministers. 7 °
Thus, civil courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims.
A. The Difference Between Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a
Claim
The Third Circuit's confusion in Petruska regarding the distinction between a
subject-matter jurisdiction defense and the defense of failure to state a claim is not
unique. 17' As the Supreme Court noted in a recent Title VII case, Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., courts often confuse or conflate two concepts that must be distinguished:
"federal-court 'subject-matter' jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essential ingre-
dients of a federal claim for relief."'172 The Court in Arbaugh held that the statutory
employee-numerosity requirement for establishing employer status under Title VII
was not a matter of subject-matterjurisdiction.173 Instead, that numerosity requirement
was an element of the plaintiff's claim for relief, and thus was properly raised in a
12(b)(6) objection (which cannot be raised after trial), rather than as a 12(b)(1)
objection (which, pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), can be raised at any time).'74
The Arbaugh Court explained:
On the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief
dichotomy, this Court and others have been less than meticulous.
'Subject-matter jurisdiction in federal question cases is sometimes
erroneously conflated with a plaintiff's need and ability to prove
court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong.... ' A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a par-
ticular type of legal controversy."(quoting Figueroa v. C & S Ball Bearing, 675 A.2d 845, 847
(Conn. 1996))); id. at 325 ('The ministerial exception prevents courts or government agencies
from exercising jurisdiction over a religious institution's actions regarding the employment
of its ministers.").
169 See discussion supra Part I.
170 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining
that the ministerial exception is "judicial shorthand" for the conclusion that "the imposition
of secular standards on a church's employment of its ministers will burden the free exercise
of religion").
171 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098
(2007).
17' 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006).
7 Id. at 504.
174 id.
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the defendant bound by the federal law asserted as the predicate
for relief-a merits-related determination.' 
175
Because Title VII actions are civil actions arising under the laws of the United States,
subject-matter jurisdiction in the case before the Court in Arbaugh existed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 133 1.176 Subject-matterjurisdiction "involves a court's power to hear
a case,"'177 and § 1331 gave the court the power to hear this Title VII case. 178 Whether
Y & H Corporation employed enough people to be bound by the prohibitions of
Title VII was a question of the merits, an element of the plaintiffs claim, and not a
matter of subject-matterjurisdiction. 179 If the employer does not employ the statutorily
required number of employees, the employer is not bound to comply with Title VII
and the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under the statute. A court has the power
to hear such a case, but it lacks power under the statute to provide the plaintiff with
any relief, because the plaintiff is unable to establish one of the essential predicates
for obtaining relief.'
At first blush, the Court's analysis in A rbaugh would seem to validate the Third
Circuit's approach to the ministerial exception defense in Petruska. The Petruska
court reasoned that it had the power to hear Petruska' s case, because she had raised
a claim arising under federal law.' The ministerial exception defense, in the court's
view, did not bar "the court's 'very power to hear the case.""1 82 Instead, the exception
allows the defendant to argue that "the First Amendment bars Petruska's claims....
The exception may serve as a barrier to the success of a plaintiff s claims, but it does
not affect the court's authority to consider them."'8 3 Section 1331 allows the court to
hear Petruska's claim, but the First Amendment bars the court from providing her
with any relief under Title VII."'4 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded, the ministerial
exception gives rise to a 12(b)(6) objection, not a 12(b)(1) objection.'85
Yet the reason why the plaintiffs claim was barred in Petruska made that case
quite different from the case before the Court in Arbaugh. In Arbaugh, the question
boiled down to this: is the plaintiff entitled to relief under the terms of the statute
175 Id. at511.
176 Id. at 503.
'7 Id. at 514.
178 Id. at 513 ("A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable
claim 'arising under' the Constitution or laws of the United States.").
"9 Id. at 516.
180 See supra note 58.
181 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
2098 (2007).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 302-03.
194 id.
185 Id.
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that the plaintiff has asserted as the predicate for relief?186 If the defendant employs
the requisite number of employees, Title VII applies, and the plaintiff can state a claim
for relief under the statute. In Petruska, in contrast, the plaintiff would seem to be able
to state a claim establishing all the essential elements for relief under Title VII. 87 As
the Fourth Circuit explained in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, while Title VII does allow religious organizations to take religion into
account in hiring, the statute does not authorize religious organizations to make minis-
terial hiring decisions on the basis of race or sex. 8' Instead, both the text and history
of the statute led the court to "conclude that Title VII, by 'the affirmative intention of
the Congress, clearly expressed,' applies to [ministerial) employment decision[s]." 9
Moreover, the Petruska court explicitly referenced Rayburn in its discussion of the
jurisdictional question: "[W]e agree with the Fourth Circuit that Congress intended
Title VII to apply to cases involving sexual discrimination and retaliation by reli-
gious institutions. We must therefore reach the constitutional question-i.e., whether
application of Title VII to a ministerial employment relationship violates the First
Amendment."' 9 This constitutional question, however, would seem to lead back to
the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. The First Amendment bars relief in ministerial
exception cases precisely because courts lack the "very power" to hear the employ-
ment discrimination cases brought by ministerial employees.' 9' Courts cannot hear
and decide such cases without violating the First Amendment. 192 In other words, the
First Amendment removes such cases from the adjudicatory power of the courts.
B. The Ministerial Exception as a Limitation on Adjudicatory Power
A careful reading of the cases that provide the foundation for the ministerial
exception reveals that the exception should be understood as a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction. In the first case to recognize the ministerial exception, McClure
v. Salvation Army, the Fifth Circuit characterized the exception in jurisdictional
terms.'93 Billie B. McClure brought a Title VII sex discrimination action against the
Salvation Army, after the Salvation Army terminated her status as an officer."9 She
alleged that she had received a lower salary and fewer benefits than similarly situ-
116 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
187 Petruska, 462 F.3d 294.
198 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986).
189 Id. at 1167 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979)).
190 Petruska, 462 F.3d at 304 n.4.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
192 Id.
193 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (affirming the
district court's order "sustaining The Salvation Army's motion to dismiss the complaint for
want of jurisdiction").
194 Id. at 555.
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ated male officers and that she had been discharged because of her complaints about
that adverse treatment to her superiors and to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.' 9 Mrs. McClure conceded that the Salvation Army should be consid-
ered a religion and that, as an officer, she was a minister "engaged in the religious
or ecclesiastical activities of the church." '196 At the same time, she argued that the
Salvation Army was not exempt from prohibition of sex discrimination in employ-
ment established by Title VII.' 97
Section 702 of Title VII does allow religious organizations to take religion into
account when hiring employees to perform work connected to the organization's
religious activities.'98 The text of the statute does not, however, exempt religious
employers from complying with its prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, or national origin, and efforts to exempt religious organizations
entirely from compliance with Title VII were rejected by Congress." Thus, the
Fifth Circuit, explained:
The language and the legislative history of § 702 compel the
conclusion that Congress did not intend that a religious organi-
zation be exempted from liability for discriminating against its
employees on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin with
respect to their compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.2 0
Having reached this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit had to face this constitutional
question: can Title VII be applied to the employment relationship between a church
and its minister without violating the religion clauses of the First Amendment? The
court began by explaining that, under then-prevailing free exercise doctrine, the gov-
ernment must establish a compelling interest in support of "state action which im-
poses even an 'incidental burden' on the free exercise of religion., 2" Indeed, "[i]n
this highly sensitive constitutional area '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'",202 The court then focused
195 Id.
196 Id. at 556.
197 Id.
198 Section 702 of Title VII provides "[t]his subchapter shall not apply.., to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-l (a) (2000) (emphasis added).
'99 McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
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attention on the critical nature of the church-minister relationship that would be
threatened by the application of Title VII in this case:
The relationship between an organized church and its ministers
is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the
church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this rela-
tionship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical
concern. Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is a
matter of church administration and government, so are the func-
tions which accompany such a selection. It is unavoidably true
that these include the determination of a minister's salary, his place
of assignment, and the duty he is to perform in the furtherance
of the religious mission of the church.2 3
Characterizing the terms of employment between a church and its ministers as "a
matter of church administration and government" allowed the Fifth Circuit to con-
nect Mrs. McClure's Tide VII action to a series of Supreme Court precedents that
had described the boundary between governmental authority and church authority
in jurisdictional terms.20 4 The court explained that, beginning with its opinion in
Watson v. Jones,205 "the Supreme Court began to place matters of church govern-
ment and administration beyond the purview of civil authorities." 206 Watson involved
a church property dispute between rival factions of the Presbyterian Church.2 7 The
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling enjoining one faction in the dis-
pute from interfering with the use of the property in ways that conflicted with the
decision reached on the matter by the highest ecclesiastical governing body of the
Presbyterian Church.208 At the time of the Watson decision, the First Amendment
had not yet been held applicable to the states," 9 but the Court understood the principle
governing its decision as a component of the American commitment to religious
freedom:
In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should
govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of
the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and
supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that,
203 Id. at 558-59.
204 Id. at 559.
205 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
206 McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
207 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 717-18.
208 Id. at 699-700, 727, 734-35.
209 Watson was a diversity case decided on the basis of general federal common law in the
era prior to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See 80 U.S. 13 (Wall.) at 694;
id. at 736-37 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them.21°
The Court recognized that judicial practice in England had been different, but
the "full, entire, and practical freedom for all forms of religious belief and practice
which lies at the foundation of our political principles" '' demanded that the civil
courts stay out of internal matters of church governance:
The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in
the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and
to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of
faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government
of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within
the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves
to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government,
and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any
one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular
courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these reli-
gious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the deci-
sion of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions
should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject
only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.212
Eighty years later, in Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, another church property
dispute gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to tie the principle articulated in
Watson to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.2 3 In Kedroff, the Court
struck down a New York statute that purported to transfer administrative control of
the Russian Orthodox churches in North America from the Patriarch in Moscow to
church authorities selected by a convention of Russian Orthodox groups in North
America.1 4 Under the statute, the bishop appointed by the Patriarch in Moscow was
210 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
211 Id. at 728.
212 Id. at 728-29.
213 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952) (noting that Watson had been decided "beforejudicial rec-
ognition of the coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of the
First Amendment against state action").
214 Id. at 97-98.
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denied access to the St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York.21 5 In holding that the New
York statute was an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion, the Court
drew on its prior opinion in Watson.216 While Watson itself had not been decided
under the Free Exercise Clause,
[t]he opinion radiate[d] . . . a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or manip-
ulation-in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy.., we think,
must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a
part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.2 7
In light of Watson and Kedroff, the Fifth Circuit in McClure concluded that Title
VII could not be applied to the employment relationship between Mrs. McClure and
the Salvation Army without violating the First Amendment. 218 The court explained
that the issues raised by Mrs. McClure's employment discrimination claim-whether
decisions made by the Salvation Army regarding her ministerial assignment, salary,
and duties violated Title VII-were "matters of church administration and government
and thus, purely of ecclesiastical cognizance.2 '9 Adjudication of her claim would
involve investigation and review of ecclesiastical practices and decisions and "would,
as a result, cause the State to intrude upon matters of church administration and gov-
ernment which have so many times before been proclaimed to be matters of a singular
ecclesiastical concern. 220 This might easily and improperly allow control of "strictly
ecclesiastical matters" to "pass from the church to the State," depriving the church
of the power to decide for itself matters of church administration and governance.221
Finally, the investigation and review involved in adjudicating a minister's employment
discrimination claim "could only produce by its coercive effect the very opposite of
that separation of church and State contemplated by the First Amendment.,
222
In short, allowing Mrs. McClure's employment discrimination claim to proceed
"would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious freedom which
it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amend-
ment."223 The court, however, backed away from holding that the case involved a
215 Id. at 96-97.
216 Id. at 110.
217 Id. at 116.
218 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896
(1972).
219 Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 id.
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conflict between a clearly applicable federal statute and a constitutional prohibition in
which the statute must give way.224 The analysis up to this point seemed to demand
that the court hold that the First Amendment prevented application of Title VII in this
case. Yet, in the last paragraph of the opinion, the McClure court abruptly chose to
frame its holding in terms of constitutional avoidance. 225 "We... hold that Congress
did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title
VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister. '226 On this
basis, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for want ofjurisdiction.227
Because of this avoidance strategy, the court's actual holding might, in fact, be
better understood as affirning dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, rather than for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The court interprets the statute itself not to apply to the church-minister relationship;
in other words, the statute fails to create a cause of action that would allow the
minister to obtain relief for employment discrimination against her church
employer.228 Yet the more plausible reading of Title VH, as the court itself recog-
nized earlier in its opinion, "compel[s] the conclusion that Congress did not
intend, 229 to exempt religious organizations from liability for discriminating on the
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.
If ministerial claims are to be excluded, it must be because the religion clauses
of the Constitution bar the federal government and the states from interfering with
matters of purely ecclesiastical cognizance like the employment relationship be-
tween a church and its ministers. The government cannot regulate the relationship
and the courts cannot adjudicate claims that implicate the relationship. Thus, the First
Amendment removes disputes regarding church governance and administration from
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the civil courts, federal or state.23
The Fourth Circuit adopted the more plausible reading of Title VII and ad-
dressed the constitutional issue head-on in Rayburn v. General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists.23' In Rayburn, the court held that the First Amendment
barred a woman denied a pastoral position in the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
224 Id. at 560-61.
225 Id. at 560 ("'[If a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided."' (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))).
226 Id. at 560-61; see also Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472,475 (7th Cir. 2008)
(characterizing the ministerial exception as an interpretive rule, not a constitutional rule).
227 McClure, 460 F.2d at 561.
228 Id. at 560.
229 Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
230 See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
23 1 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). The Seventh
Circuit's recent reversion to the interpretive rule understanding of the ministerial exception,
see Schleicher, 518 F.3d at 475, makes no reference to the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Rayburn.
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from raising a Title VII sex and race discrimination claim against the Church.232
Unlike the Fifth Circuit in McClure, the Rayburn court concluded that it could not
"impose upon a statute a limiting construction where to do so would strain congres-
sional intent."2 33 Here, the "language and the legislative history of Title VII both
indicate that the statute exempts religious institutions only to a narrow extent. 234
Thus, Ms. Rayburn's claim produced a collision between Title VII and the First
Amendment that the court could not avoid.
The Fourth Circuit in Rayburn was able to draw on an additional precedent in the
Supreme Court's Watson-Kedroff line of church autonomy cases.235 In Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, decided four years after McClure, the Court
held that the Illinois Supreme Court violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by
issuing a decision that invalidated a reorganization plan adopted by the American-
Canadian Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church. 236 The case arose after the
Holy Assembly of Bishops and Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church (the
Mother Church) removed Dionisije Milivojevich as bishop of the American-Canadian
diocese.237 The removal followed Milivojevich's refusal to accept the reorganization
plan adopted by the Holy Assembly and to turn administration of the Diocese over to
a new bishop appointed by the Holy Assembly.238 Milivojevich sought an injunction
in Illinois state court to prevent the Mother Church from interfering with diocesan
assets and to have himself declared the true Diocesan Bishop.239 The Illinois Supreme
Court ultimately held that Milivojevich's removal had to be set aside as "arbitrary,"
because the removal was "not conducted according to the Illinois Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Church's constitution and penal code." 240 The court further held
that "the Diocesan reorganization was invalid because it was beyond the scope of the
Mother Church's authority to effectuate such changes without Diocesan approval." 24'
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.242 The Court explained that "[tihe fallacy fatal
to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court" was that court's "impermissible rejec-
tion of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals" of the hierarchical Mother
Church on the disputed issues. 243 The Illinois court "impermissibly substitute[d] its
own inquiry into church polity" in resolving the dispute between Milivojevich and
232 Rayburn, 772 F.2d 1164.
233 Id. at 1167.
234 Id. at 1166.
235 Id.
236 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 703-05.
239 Id. at 707.
240 Id. at 708.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 698.
24 Id. at 708.
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the Mother Church.'" Allowing civil courts to "'probe deeply enough into the
allocation of power"' within a hierarchical church to allow it to decide disputes
regarding church polity and administration violates the First Amendment "'in much
the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine."245 When civil courts
try to decide such disputes, "'the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free
development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of
purely ecclesiastical concern.'"2
Drawing on the principles first articulated in Watson, the Court explained that
any inquiry into whether a church's decisions complied with its own church laws and
regulations violated "the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept
the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical
polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law. '247 The Court's precedents established a "general rule that religious
controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and... a civil court
must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them. '248 By
ordering Milivojevich's reinstatement as a bishop, even though the Mother Church
considered him to be a schismatic, the Illinois Supreme Court had "unconstitutionally
undertaken the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution
the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals" of
the Mother Church.249 The diocesan reorganization undertaken by the Mother Church
was a matter of "internal church governance, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical
affairs," and, as the U.S. Supreme Court said in Kedroff, "religious freedom encom-
passes the 'power [of religious bodies] to decide for themselves, free from state inter-
ference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine."
250
The protection for church autonomy established by the Supreme Court in the
Watson-Kedroff-Milivojevich line of cases led the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn to con-
clude that adjudicating Ms. Rayburn' s employment discrimination claim was prohib-
ited by the religion clauses of the First Amendment.25 A church's free exercise rights
are burdened by any attempt "to restrict a church's free choice of its leaders."25 2 This
is a substantial burden on religious freedom, because "[t]he right to choose ministers
without government restriction underlies the well-being of religious community. "253
244 Id.
245 Id. at 709 (quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367,369 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
246 Id. at 710 (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
247 Id. at 713.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 720.
250 Id. at 721-22 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
2' Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986).
252 Id. at 1168.
213 Id. at 1167.
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Indeed, "perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those whom it se-
lects to preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrines both to its
own membership and to the world at large." While the elimination of employ-
ment discrimination is an interest whose magnitude is "difficult to exaggerate, ' 25
introducing government standards into the selection of ministers is a burden that is
too substantial to permit: it "would significantly, and perniciously, rearrange the
relationship between church and state. "256
In order to maintain the constitutionally mandated relationship between church and
state, churches must possess "the unfettered right... to resolve certain questions. 257
Therefore, "[iun 'quintessentially religious' matters, the free exercise clause protects
the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it. In these sensitive areas, the
state may no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may super-
vise doctrinal content. 25' The question of who is to serve as a minister is one of those
quintessentially religious matters that the Constitution places beyond the legitimate
authority of the state.
The Fourth Circuit also explained that subjecting a church's ministerial choices to
Title VII scrutiny would violate the Establishment Clause by "giv[ing] rise to 'excessive
governmental entanglement' with religious institutions. "259 The Establishment Clause
operates to keep government out of the sphere reserved to religion:
Bureaucratic suggestion in employment decisions of a pastoral
character, in contravention of a church's own perception of its
needs and purposes, would constitute unprecedented entanglement
with religious authority and compromise the premise "that both
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims
if each is left free of the other within its respective sphere."2'6
Yet, to affirm that the church has freedom in the religious sphere is not to claim
for the church complete freedom from the law:
Of course churches are not-and should not be-above the law.
Like any other person or organization, they may be held liable for
254 Id. at 1168.
255 Id. at 1168-69; see also id. at 1169 ("As Title VII is an interest of the highest order,
courts have held that Title VII properly applied to the secular employment decisions of a reli-
gious institution .... But courts must distinguish incidental burdens on free exercise in the
service of a compelling state interest from burdens where the 'inroad on religious liberty' is
too substantial to be permissible." (quotingThomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,718 (1981))).
256 Id. at 1169.
257 id.
258 Id. (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,720 (1976)).
" Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
260 Id. at 1171 (quoting McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)).
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their torts and upon their valid contracts. Their employment deci-
sions may be subject to Tide VII scrutiny, where the decision does
not involve the church's spiritual functions.26'
The case of a ministerial employment decision, however, is different. Such a de-
cision does involve the church's spiritual functions, and thus, the Constitution does
place the decision beyond the reach of the law. With respect to the question of who
a church selects to serve as its minister, "the Constitution requires that civil authori-
ties decline to review either the procedures for selection or the qualifications of those
chosen or rejected."' 62 To say that the Constitution requires civil authorities to
"decline to review" a particular class of cases seems to be another way of saying that
the Constitution removes that class of cases from the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the civil courts.263
C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Characteristics of the Ministerial Exception
The case of Bell v. Presbyterian Church264 provides a clear example of the way
in which this jurisdictional bar operates-even when the federal jurisdictional statutes
provide a textual basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. James M. Bell was an
ordained minister who was called by Interfaith Impact to serve as its executive
director. 65 Four national religious organizations (including the Presbyterian Church,
U.S.A.) created and funded Interfaith Impact, which was a non-profit corporation
whose mission was "to advance the jointly shared religious purposes of its members,
namely, to carry out their theological imperative to increase the possibilities for peace,
economic and social justice."266 In the engagement letter that outlined the terms of
Rev. Bell's service, Interfaith noted that this service "would be an extension of his
ministry" as an ordained minister in the United Church of Christ.267 Three years after
Rev. Bell began his service with Interfaith, a financial crisis in the organization arose,
and the Presbyterian Church decided not to allocate any funds to Interfaith for the
coming year.268 This led Interfaith's board of directors to continue Interfaith's min-
istry with a volunteer staff, and it terminated Rev. Bell's service as executive director
as part of a complete reduction in force.2 69
261 Id. 1171.
262 Id. at 1172.
263 Id.
264 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
265 Id. at 330.
266 Id. at 329.
267 Id. at 330.
268 Id. at 329.
269 Id. at 330.
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Rev. Bell then filed suit against the principal contributing religious organiza-
tions.27' His complaint alleged a number of state-law tort and contract claims in an
effort to challenge the defendants' "expressed reason for ending the program and
terminating his employment."2" The action was filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, and the complaint invoked diversity of citizenship
as the basis for federal jurisdiction. 2  While the defendants did not contest the
existence of diversity of citizenship,273 the district court granted the defendants'
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that
the "'essential core of the case' involved the Churches' decisions to allocate their
funds as they saw fit. '2 74 Because "Reverend Bell's lawsuit intruded into internal
church matters over which civil courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction," the
court dismissed the action with prejudice.275
The Fourth Circuit affirmed.276 Drawing on Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich,
the court explained that "civil courts have long taken care not to intermeddle in in-
ternal ecclesiastical disputes., 277 "In keeping with the First Amendment's" protec-
tion of religious freedom,278 it has "become established that the decisions of reli-
gious entities about the appointment and removal of ministers and persons in other
positions of similar theological significance are beyond the ken of civil courts. 279
The court, therefore, articulated the key question in the case in this way: was the
lawsuit between Rev. Bell and the four national churches an ecclesiastical dispute
about "'discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or
law, "280 or, was this "a case in which we should hold religious organizations liable
in civil courts for 'purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular
defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization'? 28
The court concluded that the lawsuit was best characterized as an ecclesiastical
dispute.282 While the complaint was framed in terms of tort and contract claims, Bell's
allegations, "[a]t bottom,. . . focuse[d] on how the constituent churches spen[t] their
270 Id. at 329.
271 Id. at 330.
272 Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant at v, Bell, 126 F.3d 328 (No. 96-1297) (noting that juris-
diction in the action against the corporate defendants was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)).
273 id.
274 Brief for the Appellees, Bell, 126 F.3d 328 (No. 96-1297) (Statement of the Case).
275 Id.
276 Bell, 126 F.3d at 333.
277 Id. at 330; see also id. at 330-31 (discussing Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich).
278 Id. at 330.
279 Id. at331.
280 Id. (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)).
281 Id. (quoting Gen. Council on Finance & Admin. of the United Methodist Church v. Cal.
Super. Ct., 439 U.S. 1369, 1373 (1978)).
282 Id. at 332-33.
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religious outreach funds. '213 Judicial resolution of that question would "interpose
the judiciary" into decisions at the heart of how the defendant churches governed their
spiritual mission, decisions "relating to how and by whom they spread their message
and specifically their decision to select their outreach ministry through the granting
or withholding of funds."284 These decisions "about the nature, extent, administration,
and termination of a religious ministry fall[ ] within the ecclesiastical sphere that the
First Amendment protects from civil court intervention., 285 Accordingly, even though
the diversity statute purported to authorize federal jurisdiction over Rev. Bell's law-
suit, the court concluded that his claim fell within the category of cases that the First
Amendment removes from the subject-matter jurisdiction of the civil courts.286
Unlike the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any point in the course ofjudicial
proceedings,287 and the subject-matter jurisdiction issue can be raised by the court
sua sponte.288 Judge Oberdorfer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
treated the ministerial exception in just this way in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Catholic University ofAmerica.289 The case was brought by the EEOC
and Sister Elizabeth McDonough, who alleged that Catholic University had engaged
in sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII when it denied Sister
McDonough's application for tenure in the university's Department of Canon Law.2 °
After the trial concluded, and the parties had submitted proposed findings and con-
clusions in the case, Judge Oberdorfer requested that the parties file briefs "addressing
the question [of] whether the First Amendment precludes maintenance and adjudication
of Sister McDonough's claims .,, 291 The judge had begun to question his constitutional
authority to hear the case in the midst of the trial, because much of the testimony con-
283 Id. at 332.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 333.
286 Id.
287 Compare FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action.") with FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) ("A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted... may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.").
288 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (the appearance of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can
be raised "by suggestion of the parties or otherwise").
289 856 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Lupu &
Tuttle, Faith-BasedInitiative and the Constitution, supra note 37, at 34 n. 162 (2005) ("Because
the limitations [of the ministerial exception], born of both Establishment and Free Exercise
considerations, go to subject matterjurisdiction of the civil courts, judges can and do raise them
sua sponte."); id. (noting that the court of appeals in Catholic University "approv[ed] of the
district court's refusal to proceed with adjudication of [the plaintiffs' Title VII] claim against
Catholic University, despite the parties' willingness to proceed on the merits").
290 Catholic Univ., 856 F. Supp. at 2.
291 Id.
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cerned the quality of Sister McDonough's canon law scholarship, especially as com-
pared to the work of the two most recent applicants for tenure in the department, both
of whom were men.292 This caused Judge Oberdorfer to express "his uneasiness at
'sitting on the qualifications of an expert in canon law"' and to suggest that "the line
of inquiry was 'getting awful[ly] close to entangling the government and the judiciary
in religious matters." 293 After hearing post-trial oral argument on the constitutional
question, the judge concluded that Sister McDonough's role in the Canon Law de-
partment required her to be characterized as a ministerial employee of a religious insti-
tution.294 Accordingly, applying Title VII to the facts and relationships in her case
"would violate both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses by entangling
government in a primarily religious function and relationship, 295 and the district
court dismissed the case without reaching the merits. 29 Both the court's sua sponte
introduction of the First Amendment question after triaP97 and the court's conclusion
that it was without constitutional authority to decide the action on the merits demon-
strate that the court understood the ministerial exception to be an issue of subject-
matter jurisdiction, rather than a matter of the sufficiency of the plaintiff' s claim. 298
These cases support the conclusion reached by the district court in Petruska:
"the ministerial exception partakes of jurisdictional qualities, as it implicates
constitutionally mandated restraints on [a court's] power to adjudicate certain types
of employment disputes."2 99 This sort of "constitutionally compelled limitation on
292 Id. at 8.
293 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,459 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Transcript
of Record, at 9-10, Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455); see also id. ("'I've got to pass on people's
judgment about colleagues in a religious setting ... and when I hear this ... aggressive
examination of a priest about what is at least partly his clerical duties, I've got a problem."')
(quoting Transcript of Record, at 147, Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455).
294 Catholic Univ., 856 F. Supp. at 12-13.
295 Id. at 9.
296 Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 460. Judge Oberdorfer explained that the investigation and
proceeding "ha[d] impermissibly entangled the civil authorities in religious decision-making."
Such entanglement impairs "a religious institution's choice of those who teach its doctrine
and participate in church governance. Therefore, the religion clauses of the First Amendment
preclude decision of this Title VII action on its merits." Catholic Univ., 856 F. Supp. at 13.
297 See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(3).
298 See 2 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34[6] [a] (3d ed.
2005) ("A dismissal for failure to state a claim is a judgment on the merits, unlike dismissals
for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. . . ."); see also Kirkham v. Societe Air
France, 429 F.3d 288, 291 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that a court can render a decision on the
merits "only afterjurisdiction has been established"); Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116
(7th Cir. 1987) ("Seeking summary judgment on a jurisdictional issue ... is the equivalent
of asking a court to hold that because it has no jurisdiction the plaintiff has lost on the merits.
This is a nonsequitur.").
299 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 350 F. Supp. 2d 666,682 (W.D. Pa. 2004), affid inpart on
other grounds, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007).
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civil authority ''30° with respect to a particular category of disputes-a particular
subject matter-is best described as a limitation on a court's subject-matterjurisdic-
tion. The limitation on the scope of civil jurisdiction manifest in the ministerial
exception "ensures that no branch of secular government trespasses on the most
spiritually intimate grounds of a religious community's existence."30 1  As the
Seventh Circuit explained in Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria,3 2 the courts are
''secular agencies" that do not possess the power to "exercise jurisdiction over the
internal affairs of religious organizations., '303 Intra-ecclesial doctrinal disputes
"ha[ve] never been justiciable in the federal courts, ' '304 and lawsuits that implicate
the governance structure of a church, even when they do not raise a question of
religious doctrine, lie outside the power of the courts. Secular "courts will not
assume jurisdiction if doing so would interfere with the church's management., 30 5
D. Qualified Immunity or Sovereign Immunity?
The ministerial exception cases sometimes describe the exception as protecting
a sphere in which religion is sovereign. In Catholic University, for example, the
D.C. Circuit explained its conclusion that the ministerial exception doctrine still
survives after the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith3°6 in
these terms: "[W]e cannot believe that the Supreme Court in Smith intended to qualify
3' EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000).
301 Id.
302 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 190 (2006).
303 Id. at 1037.
304 Id. at 1038.
305 Id. While the court in Tomic was addressing limits on the power of the federal courts,
state courts also recognize that they lack the power to adjudicate lawsuits implicating a
church's ministerial employment relationships and internal governance structures. See, e.g.,
Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 405 (Tex. 2007) (holding that a professional-
negligence claim against a minister must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
because it "unconstitutionally impinges upon internal matters of church governance in violation
of the First Amendment"); Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 808 N.E.2d
301,303-04, 308-09 (Mass. 2004) (holding that the constitutional rights of religious freedom
prohibit trial court from exercising subject-matterjurisdiction over pastor's employment dis-
crimination claims against church employer); Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 766
N.E.2d 820, 824 (Mass. 2002) (finding that Massachusetts case law "firmly establishe[s]" the
principle that the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom "precludes jurisdiction of
civil courts over church disputes touching on matters of doctrine, canon law, polity, discipline,
and ministerial relationships"); McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 381 S.E.2d 126, 127
(Ga. App. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989) (affirming summary judgment for the
diocese in an action brought by priest alleging breach of an employment contract: "The civil
court cannot take jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical issue even if the parties present it for reso-
lution, because the First Amendment prohibits such action by the civil judicial system").
'06 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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th[e] century-old affirmation of a church's sovereignty over its own affairs."' 7 The
Constitution recognizes that churches have sovereignty over their own internal affairs
with respect to ministerial employment-in other words, the Constitution protects
a church's "right of autonomy in its own domain" 3°8-and this sovereignty overrides
even the state's strong interest in eliminating employment discrimination.3 9 Similarly,
the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn understood the ministerial exception as a manifes-
tation of the Supreme Court's assertion that "both religion and government can best
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere., 310 Thus, the ministerial exception follows from the proposition that "the First
307 EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 463; see also Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (quoting Catholic Univ.).
The "century-old affirmation of a church's sovereignty over its own affairs" refers to the line
of church autonomy cases that find their foundation in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871),
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), and Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976). Every circuit to have addressed the question of the post-Smith survival of the
ministerial exception has recognized the exception's continued validity. See EEOC v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.* (4th Cir. 2000) (citing cases). One cir-
cuit, over a strong dissent, seems to have avoided the question of the post-Smith validity of
the ministerial exception by pointing to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), not
the ministerial exception, as the proper defense to be raised in a Methodist minister's action
against the church under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See Hankins v. Lyght,
441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006); id. at 109-19 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (rejecting the court's
RFRA analysis in favor of a statutory ministerial exception); see also Rweyemamu v. Cote,
520 F.3d 198,203 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (expressing "doubts about Hankins's determination that
RFRA apples" in this context); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042
(7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 190 (2006) (criticizing Hankins as "unsound" be-
cause RFRA is applicable only to suits in which the government is a party). As the Tomic court
explained,
It is hardly to be imagined... that in seeking to broaden the protection
of religious rights [after Smith], Congress, dropping nary a hint, wiped
out a long-established doctrine that gives greater protection to religious
autonomy than RFRA does. Indeed, a serious constitutional issue would
be presented if Congress by stripping away the ministerial exception
required courts to decide religious questions. The exception is based on
the establishment and free-exercise clauses of the First Amendment,
which place tight limits on governmental authority to regulate religion.
Id. at 1042 (citations omitted).
308 Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 467.
309 Id.
311 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948), quoted in Rayburn v. Gen.
Conference Of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1104, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985).
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Amendment recognizes two spheres of sovereignty 311 that structure the institutional
relationship between government and religion.
Rooting the ministerial exception in the First Amendment's recognition of a pro-
tected sphere of religious sovereignty provides further support for understanding the
exception as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Third Circuit in Petruska
used an analogy to qualified immunity in support of its conclusion that the ministerial
exception should be understood as a defense challenging the sufficiency of the plain-
tiffs claim, rather than as a challenge to the court's subject-matterjurisdiction.1 But
the better analogy may be to the jurisdictional defense of sovereign immunity, rather
than the defense of qualified immunity. While it is appropriate to raise the defense of
qualified immunity in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,31 3 the
defense of sovereign immunity is generally understood to be an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction3"4 properly raised in a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.31 5
31 Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007); see also Esbeck, Dissent and
Disestablishment, supra note 112, at 1392 (noting that the non-establishment principle pre-
supposes "the existence of dual authorities, each with its sphere of proper jurisdiction and each
with some jurisdiction held to the exclusion of the other"; "[S]ince the fourth century Western
civilization has presupposed that there are not one but two sovereigns. Each has a jurisdiction
of legitimate operation, and while there are areas of shared cognizance, there are other subject
matter areas in which each is noncompetent to perform the tasks of the other."); supra Part II
(explaining that the structural establishment protects a sphere of sovereignty for the church).
312 Petruska v.Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2098
(2007).
313 See, e.g., Goodman v. Town of Golden Beach, 988 F. Supp. 1450, 1455 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
("A government official's entitlement to qualified immunity is a question of law that is appro-
priately determined before trial in one of three ways: (1) on a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim...; (2) in a [Rule 12(c)] request for judgment on the pleadings...;
or (3) on [Rule 56] motion for summary judgment.").
314 See, e.g., Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n.2 (1998) ("[T]he Eleventh
Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court's judicial
power, and therefore can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.. . ."); FDIC v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 475 (1994) ("Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.") (referring to federal
sovereign immunity); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)
("[Tihis Court has recognized that [the] greater significance [of the Eleventh Amendment] lies
in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of [state] sovereign immunity limits the grant
ofjudicial authority in Art. I."); United States v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000) ('The Eleventh Amendment's admonition is juris-
dictional in nature"; it accomplishes its purpose of "preserving state [sovereign immunity]...
through jurisdictional limitation"); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654 ("The natural consequence of the sovereign immunity prin-
ciple is that the absence of consent by the United States is a fundamental defect that deprives
the court of subject matter jurisdiction."); cf Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391
(1998) (stating that "we have not decided" the question of whether "Eleventh Amendment
immunity is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction"); id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that because it can be waived and courts need not raise it sua sponte, "the jurisdictional
bar erected by the Eleventh Amendment" has a "hybrid nature"); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. 261,267 (1997) (unlike Article III limits on judicial power which altogether disqualify
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The ministerial exception exists because the Constitution denies courts the
authority to decide a defined category of cases.3"6 Similarly, the various aspects of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity deny courts the authority to hear and decide a defined
category of cases: claims against governmental sovereigns, which are barred unless
the sovereign has consented to suit,317 or, in the case of foreign sovereigns, unless
Congress has granted the federal courts authority to hear the case.1 Unlike foreign
sovereign immunity, which is a "matter of grace and comity on the part of the United
States, .... not a restriction imposed by the Constitution,"319 the ministerial exception
is a constitutionally imposed restriction on the power of courts. Thus, when the
ministerial exception applies, the religion clauses of the First Amendment limit the
Article III power of the federal courts in a way similar to the limit imposed on federal
judicial power by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of state sovereign immu-
nity. While the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted as "an exemplification" of
a "fundamental rule" of state sovereignty,32° the line of cases stemming from Watson
teach that the First Amendment stands as an exemplification of a fundamental rule of
church autonomy. Like the Eleventh Amendment, the jurisdictional bar raised by the
First Amendment ministerial exception "operates as an additional boundary on
[judicial] power, supplementing the restraints on judicial power already implicitly
provided in Article Ill of the Constitution."321
federal court from deciding cases outside the reach of Article I1, Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity can be waived; 'The Amendment, in other words, enacts a sovereign
immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the Federal Judiciary's subject-matter
jurisdiction").
315 See, e.g., Hamm v. United States, 483 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (because sovereign
immunity is jurisdictional in nature, where a waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply,
a suit should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1), not 12(b)(6)); Nair v. Oakland County Cmty.
Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469,476 (6th Cir. 2006) (threshold defense of state sovereign
immunity is usually invoked "by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)"); Kirkham
v. Societe Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 291 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[P]arties seeking [Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act] immunity do so through Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction."); WRIGHT & MLER, supra note 314, at § 1350 (the 12(b)( 1)
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is appropriate "when the plaintiff's
claim is barred by one of the various aspects of the doctrine of sovereign immunity").
36 See supra text accompanying notes 299-305.
317 See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States, as
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to
be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." (citations omitted)).
318 Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352, 2355
(2007) (noting that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "'provides the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court"' (quoting Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989))).
3 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
32o See In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490,497 (1921).
321 United States v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1999) (referring to the
Eleventh Amendment).
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The defense of qualified immunity is quite different. Qualified immunity is not
a limitation on judicial power to hear and decide a certain category of cases.322
Instead, qualified immunity protects certain categories of defendants from having to
defend a suit under certain factual conditions.3 23 "The defense of 'qualified immunity'
requires courts to enter judgment in favor of a government employee unless the
employee's conduct violates 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."' 324 The subject matter of the lawsuits
against government officials are clearly within the judicial power of the court, and if
the relevant factual conditions do not exist, the defendant will be required to defend
the action and the court has the power to enter judgment against them.325
This protection afforded governmental officials by the defense of qualified inimu-
nity is not mandated by the Constitution. Instead, the Supreme Court has created the
existing doctrine of qualified immunity in order to foster particular policy goals: pro-
viding immunity from suit for "all but the plainly incompetent or those who know-
ingly violate the law"326 is intended to reduce the social costs of litigation against
governmental officials, which include "the increased expense to the government, the
diversion of official attention from official duties, and the deterrence of able citizens
from pursuing public office." '327 Because this particular structure of immunity protec-
tion is not required by the Constitution, Congress could, if it wished, create a different
sort of immunity defense in actions against governmental employees that allege
violations of constitutional or statutory rights.32 In contrast, the ministerial exception
is a constitutionally compelled limitation on the power of civil authorities. 329 Thus,
the analogy to qualified immunity invoked by the Third Circuit in Petruska is not
persuasive.33' The ministerial exception seems more closely akin to the jurisdictional
322 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985).
323 id.
324 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
325 See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1997) (describing the
availability of damages in Bivens actions and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
326 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
327 Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1161 (2005) (citing
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814); see also Chen, supra note 325, at 11-12 (immunity law arises out
of the Supreme Court's struggle to balance the benefits of compensating individuals harmed
by official misconduct against the competing social policy concerns that arise from lawsuits
against public officials).
328 See Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983
Damage Remedyfor Law Enforcers'Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447,461-63,461 n.59 (1978).
329 See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
330 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098
(2007).
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defense of sovereign immunity, rather than to the conditional immunity from suit
defense established by the doctrine of qualified immunity. 3
E. Does It Matter?
It may seem as though the question of whether the ministerial exception should
be characterized as a jurisdictional defense or as a defense challenging the legal
sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim is a question without practical significance.332
Whether the exception is asserted as a 12(b)(1) defense or as a 12(b)(6) defense, the
plaintiffs claim will be dismissed at the outset of the litigation if the ministerial
exception applies.333 If there "is no realistic possibility" that dismissing the action
for failure to state a claim "will expand the Court's power beyond the limits that the
jurisdictional restriction has imposed,"' 31 why spend much energy thinking about
331 The ministerial exception is more closely analogous to sovereign immunity than it is to
qualified immunity, but the jurisdictional character of the ministerial exception is not iden-
tical to that of sovereign immunity. Unlike sovereign immunity, which can be waived, see
supra notes 313, 317, the ministerial exception cannot be waived and should be raised by the
court sua sponte. See supra notes 296-305 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir.1996).
332 Cf. Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472,478 (7th Cir. 2008) (characterizing dis-
missal under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than under Rule 12(c) as a "mistake, though a harmless one").
313 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31 Cf. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765,779 (2000). The Court
in Vermont Agency was faced with a case that raised two questions: (1) whether the federal
False Claims Act should be interpreted to create a cause of action that permits an individual
to bring an action on behalf of the United States against a state, and (2) whether such a suit
by an individual against a state would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 778. The
Court concluded that the question of statutory interpretation was logically antecedent to the
Eleventh Amendment question and that there was
no realistic possibility that addressing the statutory question [would] expand the
Court's power beyond the limits that the jurisdictional restriction has imposed.
The question whether the statute provide[d] for suits against the States... d[id]
not, as a practical matter, permit the court to pronounce upon any issue, or upon
the rights of any person, beyond the issues and persons that would be reached
under the Eleventh Amendment inquiry anyway.
Id. at 779. The Court explained that "[tihis combination of logical priority and virtual coinci-
dence of scope makes it possible, and indeed appropriate, to decide the statutory issue first."
Id. at 779-80. In the context of the ministerial exception, however, the court is not faced with
the logically prior question of whether or not the law creates a cause of action allowing a
particular employment discrimination claim to be asserted against a religious institution. The
ministerial plaintiff typically has raised a claim under a statute that creates a cause of action for
employment discrimination that (as the Fourth Circuit held in Rayburn, in the Tide VII context)
creates no statutory exception excluding religious employers from the coverage of the statute.
The constitutional question of whether the First Amendment limits the judicial authority to
decide this class of cases must, therefore, be confronted directly. Such "[q]uestions of juris-
diction, of course, should be given priority-since if there is no jurisdiction there is no authority
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this question? There are at least two reasons why it is important to get the answer
to this question right.
1. Clear Affirmation of the Penultimacy of the State
Limits on the subject-matter jurisdiction of courts are a manifestation of limita-
tions on governmental power.335 This is the most important reason why a proper
understanding of the jurisdictional character of the ministerial exception makes a
difference in the law. When federal and state courts clearly and consistently treat the
ministerial exception as a limitation on their subject-matter jurisdiction, they make
a powerful statement about the foundations of limited government: such statements
affirm the penultimacy of the state.336 The ministerial exception is rooted in this funda-
mental principle of limited government: civil authorities, including the courts, have
"a constitutionally prescribed sphere of action," and this civil sphere of authority is
separate from the sphere of action reserved to religion.337
As the Supreme Court noted in Steel Co.:
Much more than legal niceties are at stake here. The... consti-
tutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of
separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from
acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting
permanently regarding certain subjects. For a court to pronounce
upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law
when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a
338court to act ultra vires.
Thus, because the ministerial exception recognizes a constitutional limit to authorized
judicial action, it has a "separation and equilibration of powers" function.339 It keeps
the power of government separate from the sphere of action exclusively reserved for
to sit in judgment of anything else." Id. at 778 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998)).
311 See discussion supra Part IlI.
336 The phrase, "penultimacy of the state," is drawn from Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a
Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boeme, 68 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 861, 867,
923 (2000). Cf. Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEx.
REv. L. & POL. 41, 77 (2003) ("'Under God' in the Pledge of Allegiance is a means for the
state to declare that it is a limited institution that is subject to, and does not interfere with,
higher commitments and norms. In a religiously pluralistic society, however, 'under God'
is an imperfect way of making that declaration. But if 'under God' is removed from the Pledge,
the state must ... make other efforts to declare and respect its own limits.").
331 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 n.4 (subject-matter jurisdiction limitations keep courts "within
their constitutionally prescribed sphere of action").
338 Id. at 101-02 (citations omitted).
339 Id.
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religion. When a court fails to recognize that limitation on its power, the court acts
ultra vires, and offends the fundamental constitutional principle of non-establishment. 3
Paying careful attention to the limits of governmental power is about much more
than "legal niceties."'" The way in which courts speak about the character of the min-
isterial exception shapes the way judges, lawyers, and citizens understand the relation-
ship between government and religion. The law has a pedagogical function, and the
ways in which the law speaks to us (and the ways in which we speak about the law)
shape the way we look at the world. 42 As Cathleen Kaveny explains, "[a]lways and
everywhere, law teaches a moral lesson-it imbues a vision of how the members of
a particular society should live their lives together. ' '34 3 We should attend to the
jurisdictional character of the ministerial exception, because the ministerial exception
teaches an important lesson. The ministerial exception serves as a critical institutional
reminder of what Robert Tuttle has called "government's penultimacy-govemment's
reticence, and even respect, in the face of its citizens' obligations to the transcendent."'
Professor Tuttle argues that the distinctive place occupied by religious institutions
in the American constitutional order serves to highlight the state's reticence before the
transcendent.45 When the First Amendment bars application of otherwise neutral
employment discrimination laws to the ministerial choices of religious institutions,
the Constitution "testifies to the limited nature of its own authority." 346 For Tuttle,
"this testimony lacks a clear secular justification-precisely because it is a theological
'" Cf. id. at 94 (for a court to decide a merits question before addressing the jurisdictional
question of standing "carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and
thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers").
141 Id. at 101.
342 See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHiTE, HERAciS' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHErORIc ANDPOErIcs
OF THE LAW 28, 35 (1985) (law is a form of "constitutive rhetoric"; the study of law is an
inquiry into the ways in which "we constitute ourselves as individuals, as communities, and as
cultures, whenever we speak" as lawyers and judges); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Assisted Suicide,
the Supreme Court, and the Constitutive Function of the Law, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29
(1997) ("[T]hose who play a role in the legal enterprise are engaged in a type of 'constitutive
rhetoric' that actually helps shape the moral identity of the community in which they partici-
pate. The community-constituting character of law does not inhere solely in the results that
issue in particular cases, but also in the very way the questions are framed for decision.");
Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the Normative Power
of the Actual, 82 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 181, 191-92, 215,218-19 (2006) (noting that how we
talk about the law, and how we hear courts talking about the law, has an effect on who we
become as people).
" M. Cathleen Kaveny, Autonomy, Solidarity and Law's Pedagogy, 27 LOUVAIN STUD.
339, 341 (2002). Once we "acknowledge the fact that law teaches," we can "take respon-
sibility for what it teaches." Id.
344 Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation?, supra note 336, at 867.
345 Id.
34 Id. at 923.
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argument.... The exceptional nature of religious belief and conduct depends on a
religious justification: that God is God, and the state is not."347
Tuttle and his colleague Ira Lupu have tried to articulate a justification for the
distinctive role of religion in the Constitution that they argue is rooted in a political
concept of religion, rather than in a theological starting point.348 Their argument,
however, resonates with both Professor Esbeck' s theory of the structural Establish-
ment Clause and John Courtney Murray's understanding of the freedom of the
church. Lupu and Tuttle begin with the proposition that the founders established a
new political order that was distinguished by its "limited horizons. " li"[Ilts powers
would be restricted to the temporal welfare of its citizens. 350 This limit on the
jurisdiction of government, precluding government from having a religious confes-
sion of its own, "avoid[s] both conflict among religious factions for political
authority and the inevitable despotism of the religious faction that won out. 35'
Pursuant to this political concept of religion, "'religion' represents that which the
new order disclaims: jurisdiction over ultimate truths, a comprehensive claim to
undivided loyalty, and a command to worship. 352
The constitutional distinctiveness of religion-' 'a sense of boundary between state
and some aspects of institutional [religious] behavior"-is rooted in this recognition
of the limited nature of the state. 3 There are certain aspects of human life that the
state simply has no right to control. The constitutional distinctiveness of religion thus
serves as a check on totalitarianism, insulating from state control those aspects of the
behavior of religious institutions that nurture the spirit directly."a
For Lupu and Tuttle, this political doctrine of religion creates a relatively restricted
distinctive sphere for religious institutions:
The role of the contemporary state is broad indeed, but it remains
circumscribed by its penultimacy. Life's ultimate questions are
to be left in private hands, and when those hands are institutional,
the state must respect the internal life and self-governance of
such institutions. Most importantly, [this] approach is consistent
with the duality of roles of religious institutions in contemporary
America. When [religious] institutions perform functions indis-
tinguishable from other segments of the nonprofit world, the law
347 Id.
348 Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in our
Constitutional Order, 47 ViLL. L. REv. 37, 83 (2002).
349 Id. at 84.
350 Id.
351 id.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
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should treat them as their secular counterparts are treated. When,
however, religious institutions act in uniquely religious ways,
making connections with the world beyond the temporal and
material concerns that are the proper jurisdiction of the state, the
legally distinctive qualities of such institutions begin to emerge.
It is only by exploring the intrinsic limit on state power to affect
these ultimate concerns, rather than by mining the desires, activities
or teachings of religious organizations, that the distinctive place
of religious entities in our constitutional order can be located.355
The ministerial exception finds a secure home within this understanding of the con-
stitutionally protected sphere in which religious institutions function insulated from
state control. But can the law articulate principled, workable jurisdictional bound-
aries for this sphere? And does a workable understanding of religion's sovereign
sphere provide adequate protection for the theological principle of the freedom of
the church as it is understood by Murray and in the Vatican H1 Declaration on
Religious Freedom?
356
A jurisdictional line that tries to draw a distinction between claims that implicate
"inherently religious activities" and those that do not is not workable-for a theo-
logical reason. 357 There is a "religious density" to all things, 38 and the whole world
"is charged with the grandeur of God. 3 59 It is, therefore, not possible to draw
precise jurisdictional lines between the sacred and the secular, or between the
... Id. at 92.
356 See supra text accompanying notes 78-92.
317 See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
35 See Gregory A. Kalscheur, Ignatian Spirituality and the Life of the Lawyer: Finding
God in All Things-Even in the Ordinary Practice of the Law, 46 J. CATHOLIC L. STUD. 7,
19-20 (2007).
"" Gerard Manley Hopkins, "God's Grandeur," in GERARD MANLEY HOPKINs (THE
OXFORD AUTHORS) 128 (Catherine Phillips ed., 1986). As Karl Rahner explains,
Because God is greater than everything, God can be found if one flees
away from the world, but God can come to meet one on the streets in
the midst of the world. For this reason Ignatius acknowledges only one
law in his restless search for God: to seek God in all things; and this
means: to seek God in that spot where at any particular time God wants
to be found, and it means, too, to seek God in the world if God wants to
show God's self in it.... Ignatius is concerned only with the God above
the whole world, but he knows that this God, precisely by being really
above the whole world and not merely the dialectical antithesis to the
whole world, is also to be found in the world, when God's sovereign
will bids us to enter upon the way of the world.
Karl Rahner, Ignatian Mysticism of Joy in the World, in KARL RAHNER: THEOLOGIAN OFTHE
GRACED SEARCH FOR MEANING 93-94 (Geffrey B. Kelly ed., 1992).
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spiritual and the temporal.3" All human activity can be understood as having an
"inherently religious" dimension.
Accordingly, the constitutionally mandated jurisdictional line must be articu-
lated in other terms. The protected sphere of religion that is beyond the jurisdiction
of civil authority might be better defined as the realm of "uniquely religious"
activities (Lupu & Tuttle)361 or the realm of exclusively religious activities
(Esbeck).3 62 In this realm, religion is sovereign and exercises sole jurisdiction.
When religion is doing its own thing, its activities are off limits.3 63 But when
religious institutions-as they must--embody their religious mission through
temporal social service activities that are not uniquely religious (even though they
are inherently religious), they are engaged in activity that the civil authority has
jurisdiction to regulate for public order reasons.
What sorts of claims are jurisdictionally barred by a constitutionally mandated
jurisdictional line drawn to protect uniquely or exclusively religious activities? The
ministerial exception cases establish a realm of autonomy for church polity and admin-
istration, for matters of internal church governance and administration. 36 The selection
and dismissal of ministers, and the terms of ministerial service, fall squarely within
this sovereign religious realm.3' The employment of ministers is a uniquely religious
activity; it lies at the core of religion's own thing.3 67
The constitutionally mandated jurisdictional line exemplified by the ministerial
exception does provide significant constitutional protection to the theological prin-
ciple of the freedom of the church. The question of the appointment of ministers is at
the heart of church autonomy; indeed the question of the role to be played by secular
authorities in the investiture of bishops was at the heart of the medieval controversy
in which the "freedom of the church" became a revolutionary slogan.368
360 See BERMAN, supra note 106, at 111 (suggesting that the actual boundaries between
the realm of secular authority and that of spiritual authority can not, "by the very nature of
the problem, be defined abstractly"); id. at 107 (there are likely always to be "disputes at the
boundaries of the ecclesiastical and secular powers"); see also Brady, supra note 17, at
1697-98 (noting that some denominations, including the Catholic Church, understand the
activities of church social service organizations to be "suffused with religious significance");
Leslie Griffin, The Integration of Spiritual and Temporal: Contemporary Roman Catholic
Church-State Theory, 48 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 225, 251 (1987).
361 See supra text accompanying note 355.
362 See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
363 See supra text accompanying note 127.
" See supra note 93.
365 See supra text accompanying notes 354-57.
366 See supra text accompanying notes 354-57.
367 See supra text accompanying notes 354-57.
368 See BERMAN, supra note 106, at 94-113 (discussing the investiture controversy at the heart
of the "papal revolution" of the eleventh and twelfth centuries); id. at 99 ('The separation,
concurrence, and interaction of the spiritual and secular jurisdictions [that was the result of the
papal revolution] was a principal source of the Western legal tradition.").
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In order for the jurisdictional line that defines the constitutionally protected
exclusive jurisdiction of religion to be a workable principle of law, however, it may
need to be drawn in a way that limits the sovereign sphere of religion to activities
that can be described as uniquely or exclusively religious activity.369 Under this juris-
dictional framework, much inherently religious activity will inevitably be subject to
civil regulation.370 In order for the church to be the church, it must be able to engage
in social service activity in the world. As Murray noted nearly fifty years ago, the
freedom of the church must include the freedom to fulfill her "spiritual mission of
social justice and peace. ' '371 More recently, in his first encyclical, entitled Deus Caritas
Est (God is Love), Benedict XVI forcefully affirmed that love of God grounds a love
of neighbor that must be expressed through ecclesial service to the community.372
Indeed, such social service activity is a constitutive element of what it means for the
church to be the church:
[T]he exercise of charity became established as one of [the
church's] essential activities, along with the administration of
the sacraments and the proclamation of the word: love for widows
and orphans, prisoners, and the sick and needy of every kind, is as
essential to her as the ministry of the sacraments and preaching
of the Gospel. The Church cannot neglect the service of charity
any more than she can neglect the Sacraments and the Word....
These duties presuppose each other and are inseparable. For
the Church, charity is not a kind of welfare activity which could
equally well be left to others, but is a part of her nature, an indis-
pensable expression of her very being.373
The social welfare services provided by a religious entity like Catholic Charities
cannot, therefore, be understood as a simply secular or temporal activity. Instead the
concrete human services provided by Catholic Charities are an inherently religious
undertaking that expresses the "deepest nature" of the church. 374 At the same time,
while the church cannot simply leave this activity to others, there are a range of non-
religious groups, as well as the government itself, that provide similar services for
non-religious reasons. Thus, the church's inherently religious ministry of social
369 See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
370 See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
371 MURRAY, WE HoLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 39, at 75.
372 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 35 ORIGINs 541 (2006).
373 Id. at 549-50 (2006) (Nos. 22, 25, 35); see also Brady, supra note 17, at 1697-98
(arguing that the activities of Catholic social services agencies may appear secular, but they
are "suffused with religious significance"; "For the Catholic Church, social services activities
are no more secular than worship and preaching").
37' Benedict XVI, supra note 372, at 550 (No. 25).
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welfare service falls outside the sphere of the uniquely or exclusively religious. As
activity outside of that sphere, it may find itself subject to civil regulation that applies
generally to social service providers or to secular employers, and these regulations
may be justified by governmental interests that are properly characterized as public
order concerns providing a legitimate basis for governmental action.375
2. Issues Related to Removal and Supplemental Jurisdiction
The question of the jurisdictional status of the ministerial exception can become
an issue of practical significance with respect to removal and supplemental jurisdic-
tion. Religious institutions that have been sued in state court by ministers who raise
employment discrimination claims that include alleged violations of federal anti-
discrimination statutes have on occasion removed those actions to federal court and
then invoked the ministerial exception as grounds for dismissal of the action."7 6 Be-
cause assertion of the ministerial exception is a way of asserting that a court has no
subject-matter jurisdiction over a ministerial employment discrimination claim, this
removal is improper, because there is no basis for original federal jurisdiction over
such a claim. 377 The federal court, therefore, has no power to dismiss an improperly
removed case; the federal court has power only to remand the case to state court for
dismissal of the barred claim.
378
375 See supra text accompanying note 82.
376 See infra text accompanying notes 381-86.
171 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) ("[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which
the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defen-
dant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending."); 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 298, at
§ 107.1411] ("An action filed in state court may not be removed unless the federal district
courts have original jurisdiction of the action."). Removal might conceivably be proper if the
plaintiff's claims included some ground for original jurisdiction in the district court other than
the barred federal employment discrimination claim, such as state-law contract claims against
completely diverse defendants. Cf Wis. Dep't Of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381,386 (1998)
("[T]he presence in an otherwise removable case of a claim that the Eleventh Amendment may
bar does not destroy removal jurisdiction that would otherwise exist." (emphasis added)).
378 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that
the district court lacks subject matterjurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."); Int'l Primate
Prot. League v. Adm's of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991), superseded by statute,
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 ("Since
the district court had no original jurisdiction over this case .... a finding that removal was
improper deprives that court of subject matter jurisdiction and obliges a remand under the
terms of § 1447(c)."); id. at 89 ("'The literal words of § 1447(c)... on their face, give.., no
discretion to dismiss rather than remand an action."' (quoting Me. Assn. of Interdependent
Neighborhoods v. Me. Dept. of Human Services, 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 1989)));
Parker v. Della Rocco, 252 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[Section 1447(c)] addresses the
consequences of a jurisdictional flaw, i.e., it mandates a remand rather than a dismissal.");
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Confusion regarding the nature of the ministerial exception seems to have led
the court to overlook this consequence of the jurisdictional character of the excep-
tion in Ross v. Metropolitan Church of God.379 Mr. Ross, an African-American, the
former Pastor of Worship Arts of the Metropolitan Church of God, filed an action
against the church in Georgia state court after he was fired by the church's pastor.38°
The action alleged wrongful termination on the basis of race in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981, along with three state law causes of action: breach of contract,
breach of implied-in-fact contract, and promissory estoppel."' The church then
removed the action to federal court, arguing that the § 1981 claim gave the court
federal-question jurisdiction over the case.382
After removal, the church moved to dismiss Mr. Ross's complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), on the ground that his § 1981 claim was barred by the ministerial exception.383
The court agreed, and dismissed Mr. Ross's § 1981 claim.3" Because the applicability
of the ministerial exception means that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the claim, the court erred in dismissing the claim, rather than remanding the
case to state court.38 ' The court then compounded its error by going on to determine
16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 298, at § 107.14[3][b][ii] ("Section 1447(c) means that if it is
discovered that federal jurisdiction is lacking, at any stage in the proceedings, a removed case
must be remanded to state court rather than dismissed."); id. at § 107.41[1] [d][ii] ("[T]he
district court may not dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but, rather, must
remand the case to state court, even when the district court believes that pursuing the case in
state court is futile on the merits.").
379 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 Id. at 1307.
383 Id. at 1306.
394 Id. at 1312.
385 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000); supra note 377. The same error is evident in Werft v.
Desert Sw. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.
2004). In Werft, a Methodist minister resigned his position after his church employer refused
to accommodate his attention deficit disorder, dyslexia, and heart problems. He filed an
action against the church in state court in Arizona. The complaint alleged violations of three
federal statutes (Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act),
and the Arizona Civil Rights Act. The church removed the case to federal district court and
then filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that "the
First Amendment precluded civil court review of the Church's ministerial employment
decisions." Id. at 1100. The district court granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Because the claims implicated the employment relationship between church and minister,
the district court "properly dismissed" the claims. Id. at 1104. If, however, the ministerial
exception is properly understood to deprive civil courts ofjurisdiction over ministerial employ-
ment discrimination claims, this removed action was not properly dismissed; pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) it should have been remanded to state court, and once back in state court, the
action should have been dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Ross's remaining state-
law claims, which, as contract claims, were not barred by the ministerial exception.386
The court concluded that the state-law claims should be remanded to state court, but
it analyzed the issue as if retaining jurisdiction over the state-law claims was within
its power as a matter of discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367.3s7 Under the statute,
[Iln any civil action of which the district courts have original juris-
diction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article II of the United States Constitution.3"'
If, however, the district court dismisses all the claims over which it had original
jurisdiction, § 1367(c) provides that the court "may," in its discretion, "decline to exer-
cise supplemental jurisdiction" over the remaining state-law claims. 3 9 Because the
only federal-law claim in the case had been dismissed in the early stages of the liti-
gation, the court in Ross concluded that considerations of comity, judicial economy,
fairness, and convenience all favored remanding the contract claims to state court
for resolution.39 Yet in reaching this decision the court seemed to assume that it
retained the power under § 1367 to hear and decide the state-law claims if doing so
made sense in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the litigants,
and comity. 39' This power only exists, however, when the court at one point had
before it a civil action over which it had original jurisdiction. Because the ministerial
exception deprived the district court in Ross of original jurisdiction over the § 1981
claim, the court never had supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law claims,
386 Ross, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 n.2 ("While the ministerial exception generally applies
to bar state tort claims that require an inquiry into church administrative decisionmaking, it has
generally not been held to bar state law contract claims, because 'application of state contract
law does not involve government-imposed limits on [a church's] right to select its ministers,'
but rather seeks to enforce a purely voluntary promise." (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ.,
462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007))); see also Minker v.
Bait. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (minister's contract claim not barred by First Amendment so long as adjudication of
the claim would not create excessive entanglement with religion).
387 Ross, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1312-13.
388 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
389 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
3' Ross, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1312-13.
391 Id. at 1312.
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and, therefore, the court never possessed the power, in its discretion, to hear and de-
cide those claims. 392 Its only choice was to remand the state-law claims to state court.
A similar situation may arise when a plaintiff chooses to file an action in federal
court, joining state-law claims to the federal employment discrimination claim that
purports to give the federal court original jurisdiction. In Petruska for example, the
plaintiff joined several state-laws claim to her Title VII sex discrimination claim
against Gannon University.393 The district court dismissed all of her claims for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.39 On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that the
ministerial exception did not bar her breach of contract claim; unlike her Title VII
claim, the breach of contract claim did not involve government imposed limits on
the university's right to select its ministerial employees.395 Thus, the Third Circuit
held that the claims barred by the ministerial exception should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim, while the contract claim should be remanded to the district
court.396 That court, the Third Circuit seemed to assume, possessed the power to
hear and decide the contract claim so long as resolution of the claim would not
unduly entangle the court with religious matters in violation of the Establishment
Clause by requiring the court to decide doctrinal issues or engage in any inquiry
regarding ecclesiastical issues.3 97
If this contract claim is to go forward, however, it should (in the absence of
complete diversity) be in state court, not federal court. Because the ministerial
exception excluded her Title VII claim from the original jurisdiction of the district
court, that court never had supplemental jurisdiction over Petruska's state-law
claims. Thus the district court cannot now retain supplemental jurisdiction to give
any further consideration to her contract claim, even if it is not barred by the
ministerial exception.39 The Third Circuit's mistake with respect to the jurisdic-
392 Cf 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 298, at § 107.14[3] [b] [ii]. If federal question juris-
diction exists at the time of removal, but the federal question claim is defeated on the merits,
district courts retain discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
arising from the same case or controversy. "Once supplemental jurisdiction exists, it remains,
subject to the discretionary provision for remand." Id. (emphasis added).
13 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2098
(2007).
394 Id.
391 Id. at 310 ("Enforcement of a promise, willingly made and supported by consideration,
in no way constitutes a state-imposed limit upon a church's free exercise rights. Accordingly,
application of state law to Petruska's contract claim would not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.").
396 Id. at 268.
397 Id. at 312.
398 See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 210 (2d Cir. 2008) (after dismissing
plaintiff's federal discrimination claim pursuant to the ministerial exception, the district court
"had no reason to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims"). A claim dis-
missed for lack of subject-matterjurisdiction due to the applicability of the ministerial excep-
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tional character of the ministerial exception led it incorrectly to assume that the
district court had power to decide this remaining claim on remand.
CONCLUSION
When neutral regulations of general application justified by a public order ratio-
nale impose upon the church requirements that conflict with the church's doctrinal
commitments, the church's freedom to engage in its ministry is burdened. Because
the ministry of social service takes place outside of the exclusive sphere of religion,
the freedom of the church seems to collide with the nature of the free exercise analysis
established by the Court in Smith.399 Thus, current constitutional doctrine seems to
allow government to impose restrictions on the freedom of the church when the church
is engaged in activity outside of the exclusively religious sphere. Even in the context
of state constitutional claims where Smith may not apply, the freedom of the church
is not entirely secure. Thus, even a return to the pre-Smith analysis under the Federal
Constitution's Free Exercise Clause may not provide robust protection to the freedom
of the church when it is acting outside its sovereign sphere.'
The jurisdictional analysis that this Article examines will not solve that problem.
But, given the religious density of all things, perhaps it is asking too much to expect
the legal principles that flow from the Constitution to provide a simple, clear-cut,
easy-to-apply doctrinal rule protecting the theological principle of the freedom of
the church. It may not be possible to translate completely that theological principle
into the language of constitutional law. 4°0 This difficulty, however, makes it all the
more critical that we understand and apply the necessarily imperfect translation of
that principle that is found in the constitutionally mandated jurisdictional limits on
civil authority exemplified by the ministerial exception.' °2 This jurisdictional limit
implements our Constitution's recognition that the state is not the ultimate authority
tion will be dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Cronin v. S. Ind. Annual Conference,
United Methodist Church, No. l:05-cv-1804-LJM-WTL, 2007 WL 2258762, at *6 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 3, 2007). In any subsequent litigation, however, the plaintiff will be precluded from re-
litigating the issue of the applicability of the ministerial exception itself. See Kasap v. Folger
Nolan Fleming & Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("[Uinder principles
of issue preclusion, even a case dismissed without prejudice has preclusive effect on the
jurisdictional issue litigated."); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 314, at § 4436 ("Although a
dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction does not bar a second action as a matter of claim preclusion,
it does preclude relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction question.").
399 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
o See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
4o Cf White, supra note 49, at 180 ("[Olne can think of every act of judicial interpre-
tation as a kind of translation, necessarily imperfect, from one world to another, one mind
to another.").
402 See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
in all things-it embodies the constitutionally mandated principle that some things
are above or beyond the jurisdiction of the law precisely because the First Amend-
ment stands as an affirmation of the penultimacy of the state. 3 Thus, clearly and
consistently acknowledging this jurisdictional limit might teach us all to treat the
claims of religious institutions with respect and sensitivity,' even when those
institutions pursue their missions through inherently religious activity in thejurisdic-
tional sphere that lies outside of the realm of exclusive religious sovereignty.
See discussion supra Part IV.E. 1.
o White, supra note 49, at 189 (noting that "in talking in a certain way about the
Constitution we make it real"). White explains that the First Amendment calls for:
[A] set of attitudes that will enable us to face and live with the problem
it insists upon putting before us, the impossible but necessary task of
talking about religion in the language of the law.... [O]ur hope at the
end might be that we could achieve a condition of 'religious concord'
based not, ... upon contempt, credulity, or cynicism, but upon respect.
Id. at 201-02.
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